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Abstract 
 
Following a market failure from the over-issue of mortgage-backed securities to sub-prime 
borrowers who were unable to service their debt obligations, systemic risks quickly spread 
across the financial and real sectors of the United States of America’s economy in 2007/08, 
resulting in significant detractions in economic activity and undesirable downside price 
pressures. In response, the Federal Reserve implemented an unconventional monetary policy 
programme as the central bank’s traditional instruments were deemed ineffective. The 
objective of the programme was to lower long-term interest rates and restore liquidity to the 
financial sector. Lower long-term rates would in-turn stimulate economic activity and 
subsequently boost price pressures. However, with ample liquidity available and low yielding 
assets in the United States of America, investors turned to emerging market economies like 
South Africa, in search of yield. Investors channelled capital through the exchange rate, into 
bonds and equities, while decreasing market volatility. It is especially important to understand 
the impact of these actions on South African financial market variables each time the Federal 
Reserve makes announcements regarding its unconventional easing programme and 
normalisation of interest rates, should abnormal market impacts arise. In this minor 
dissertation, two empirical methods are used to assess if abnormal effects arise on South 
African financial market variables. Firstly, a “surprise” regression method with results 
suggesting changes to non-borrowed reserves at the Federal Reserve have a statistically 
significant impact on three of four selected South Africa financial market variables. The second 
method entails an event study. The event study provides evidence of abnormality displayed 
across the returns of the four selected South African financial market variables before, during, 
and after announcements pertaining to quantitative easing and normalisation of interest rates. 
The event study confirms the findings of the prior established in the “surprise” regression, 
concluding that abnormal impacts arising from the Federal Reserve’s policy actions are 
prevalent, and can result in investors earning abnormal returns.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In 2007/08 the United States of America (US) experienced a financial market crisis. The crisis 
arose out of the over-issue of mortgage bonds and credit extension to sub-prime borrowers 
Gagnon, Raskin, & Remache, 2011). Prior to default on these mortgage bonds, finance 
companies packaged them into “special purpose vehicles”, which were sold as hybrid 
derivative securities to investors in search of yield, other than low interest-bearing risk-free 
assets. These assets were traded through over the counter markets (OTCs) that were not 
closely regulated by US government authorities at the time (Kapetanios, Mumtaz, Stevens, I& 
Theodoridis, 2012). Since these newly created assets were rated well above investment 
grade, many institutional investors bought into these assets expecting higher returns with 
minimal risk. However, borrowers who had underpinned the value of these newly created 
hybrid assets began to default and could not service their debt obligations amid unsustainable 
personal consumption levels. This meant that the value of these securities fell, and investors 
subsequently lost a lot of capital. The value of real assets linked to these financial assets 
crashed, caused by a spill-over from the financial sector to the real sector of the US economy. 
With a failing housing market and a financial sector facing liquidity shortages and systemic 
shocks, the Federal Reserve (Fed) lowered the federal funds interest rate to a historical low 
in response to the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007/08, amid rising concerns of deflation 
resulting from weakening aggregate demand.  
 
However, a lower federal funds rate has proven ineffective in promoting aggregate demand 
and checking undesirable deflationary pressures, due to the zero or lower-bound constraint of 
traditional monetary policy (MP) (Swanson, 2015). Effectively, the US approaches a liquidity 
trap - where the federal funds rate is unable to further influence the level of aggregate demand. 
To overcome this dichotomy, the Fed undertakes unconventional MP easing with large-scale 
asset purchases (LSAPs), more commonly known as quantitative easing (QE). The objective 
of QE is to stimulate economic activity during periods when conventional MP instruments 
(short-term interest rates) are unable to stimulate economic activity due to the lower, or rather, 
zero-bound constraint (Fawley & Neely, 2013).  
 
QE is typically financed by creating excess reserves via a central bank’s balance sheet, 
(Bernanke, Reinhart & Sack, 2004). In this case, the Fed purchases government debt 
securities (usually with a maturity of more than 12 months), and subsequently provides cash 
deposits to holders of these debt securities. The more securities the Fed purchases, the more 
these assets’ prices rise (Labonte, 2013). Knowing that an inverse relationship exists between 
bond prices and yields, the action of the Fed’s QE puts downward pressure on bond yields 
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across the US yield curve, implying that lower bond yields are associated with increased levels 
of investment and consumption spending (Bordo & Haubrich, 2008). This is because the level 
of interest rates influences the cost of real investment and credit consumption across a 
country’s yield curve via the interest rate channel of MP. This is highlighted in research by 
Ang, Piazzesi, and Wei (2006) and Bordo and Haubrich (2008), which finds the predictive 
power of bond yields significantly influence future economic activity, especially further out the 
yield curve. Hence, the intention of QE is to drive the longer end of the yield-curve downwards, 
while checking undesirable deflationary pressures by lifting aggregate demand. This in turn 
provides increasing support for business investment, household spending, and net exports – 
through a weaker US dollar, resulting in export volumes increasing, and import volumes 
decreasing via the exchange rate channel of MP. 
 
With lower long-term interest rates, a weak US dollar (only strengthening towards QE tapering 
and normalisation of the Fed funds rate), and low interest rates across advanced economies 
(AEs) – following a similar MP stance to the US, ample liquidity in the US is driven into many 
faster growing emerging markets (EMs) in search for higher yield. Investors seek higher 
returns in EMs through portfolio rebalancing channels, by transferring liquidity to relatively 
higher interest-bearing markets than that of the US. However, portfolio rebalancing transfers 
lead to economic spill-overs to EMs, such as currency appreciation, which can wear down 
export competitiveness between AEs. As foreign investors’ demand for high yielding assets 
increases amid increasing risk appetite, increasing portfolio flows can also exert unwelcome 
upside price pressure on EM’s financial assets, possibly leading to asset bubbles (Lavigne, 
Sarker & Vasishtha, 2014). As risk appetite increases, financial market volatility in EMs is likely 
to decline. Evidence also shows that EMs, such as South Africa (SA), which rely on foreign 
capital portfolio flows to meet national savings shortfalls, and which are well integrated into 
global financial markets, are relatively more exposed to the effects of QE compared to other 
EMs (Aron, Leape, & Thomas, 2010). 
 
As the debate on the global repercussions and risks of QE continues in the global business 
community, particularly in relation to the reversal of capital flows out of EMs, insufficient 
research has been devoted to the spill-over effects and the channels of QE transmission to 
SA. Understanding the spill-overs, if any, and the channels of transmission of this 
unconventional policy is particularly relevant for the SA economy, which is highly dependent 
on foreign portfolio capital flows. For example, from 1994, net capital inflows have somewhat 
relieved low domestic savings and have had a significant impact on sustained economic 
growth in SA (Aron, Leape & Thomas, 2010). With the Fed tapering its program by decreasing 
and ultimately ending QE, and increasing the Fed funds rate, understanding QE’s impact on 
3 
 
SA has become more relevant than before. Despite knowing that QE impacts on EMs’ asset 
prices through exchange rates, equity prices, and financial market volatility (Bouraoui, 2015), 
there is little to no empirical analysis of the link and the effects on SA’s financial market. 
 
Therefore, this minor dissertation aims to bridge the gap in the literature by examining the 
impact of LSAPs and normalisation by the Fed on SA through the exchange rate (ZAR/$US), 
the SA 10-year government bond yield, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange All Share Index 
(JSE ALSI), and the SA Volatility Index (SA VIX).  
In this research, two empirical methods were used to quantitatively assess the impact of the 
Fed’s LSAPs and normalisation of MP on SA. Firstly, a “surprise” regression, as proposed by 
Cook and Hahn (1989) and later by Kuttner (2001), estimated the changes to the four SA 
study variables in relation to changes in the non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed. This 
simple regression allowed us to establish a priori relationship, that is, whether changes to the 
Fed’s non-borrowed reserves caused changes to the four SA study variables, before the 
estimation of the second empirical method, the event study. The results suggest that changes 
to the Fed’s non-borrowed reserves, resulting from LSAPs, have a statistically significant 
impact on three of the four SA study variables. However, the coefficients are relatively small, 
and this may be due to the long-dated frequency of the data used in this approach – where 
impact size is not sustainable over a low frequency period. 
The second method entailed an event study methodology as outlined by Mackinlay (1997) and 
tested by Bouraoui (2015) and Swanson (2015). The event study was not only used to assess 
the priori relationship established in the “surprise” regression but also to determine whether 
abnormality was evident in the returns of the four SA study variables in relation to LSAPs and 
normalisation by the Fed. In theory, increased LSAPs will exert downward pressure on the 
exchange rate since more capital is likely to flow into SA. Asset prices are likely to rise as 
investors seek yield, and volatility will decline following greater risk appetite. The opposite 
market effect is likely to occur upon the “taper” or reduction of LSAPs and normalisation of MP 
by the Fed. Holders of these assets may be able to make abnormal returns (ARs) based on 
market participant’s reactions to Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements–
whether or not market participants can anticipate LSAPs and normalisation of the MP. 
Because LSAPs are implemented during a globally uncertain period and given that the Fed’s 
unconventional MP was continuously evolving, with changes to both forward guidance and 
the size of LSAPs, it appears difficult for market participants to anticipate the outcome 
regarding LSAPs for each of the Fed’s FOMC announcements. The event study points to 
evidence of this with abnormality evident in the returns of the four SA study variables before, 
during, and after FOMC announcements pertaining to LSAPs and interest rate normalisation. 
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Additionally, the event study confirms the findings of the priori relationship in the “surprise” 
regression, improving on robustness.  
This research study is presented as follows:  
Chapter 2 presents a relevant literature review on the first case of LSAPs in Japan, LSAPs 
and the normalisation of MP in the US, and the spill-over effects to EMs.  
Chapter 3 discusses the methodology used in this study.  
Chapter 4 addresses the sources of the data and the necessary transformation thereof. 
Chapter 5 comprises a descriptive analysis of the variables.  
Chapter 6 presents the results of this study.  
Chapter 7 provides recommendations for future research. 
Chapter 8 concludes the mini-dissertation.  
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces Japan’s unconventional MP action and the impacts thereof on the 
Japanese economy. It then discusses the Fed’s unconventional MP action (in response to the 
GFC) and the program size and its impacts. The tapering of QE and the normalisation of US 
MP are also feature in this section. These actions form a basis for a literature analysis of the 
spill-over effects on EMs. The literature findings provide support for the basis of this minor-
dissertation and the methodology used.  
 
2.2 The case of Japan 
Following the aftermath of the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy in the 1990s, economic 
activity languished, and consumer price deflation set in. The BoJ’s reduction of its policy rate 
to zero by 1999 failed to reverse the process, rendering its traditional MP ineffective at the 
lower bound. By March 2001, with declining consumer prices, a weak banking system, and 
the prospect of another recession following the burst of the global information technology (IT) 
bubble, the BoJ implemented its Quantitative Easing Program (QEP), to combat deteriorating 
economic fundamentals. This type of MP had no precedent in the global economy and was 
the first attempt in tackling falling prices and low growth amid already extremely 
accommodative, nominal, short-term interest rates (Hayashi, 2001).  
The BoJ’s QEP consisted of three elements: (1) the main operating target, which the BoJ 
changed from the uncollateralised overnight call rate to the outstanding current account 
balances (CABs) held by financial institutions at the BoJ (i.e. bank reserves), and ultimately 
improved the CAB well in excess of required reserves; (2) the BoJ boosted its purchases of 
Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs), including those with long maturities, among other 
assets, to help achieve the target increase in CABs; and (3) to maintain the QEP until such 
time that the core consumer price index stopped declining.  
The QEP began in March 2001 with a CAB target of ¥5 trillion, higher than the required 
reserves of ¥4 trillion. The BoJ progressively raised its target range to ¥30-35 trillion, or 6 
percent to 7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) by January 2004 and maintained it at 
that level for several years. This was well in excess of required reserves and also well beyond 
the amount needed to keep overnight bank rates at zero. On the actions of the QEP, both the 
uncollateralised call rate and the three-month treasury bill rate in Japan fell to almost zero, 
while bank loan rates steadily declined and 10-year JGB yields fell during the first couple of 
years of the QEP. 
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When viewing the QEP’s impact on Japan’s economy, several researchers such as Bowman 
Cai, Davies, and Kamin, (2011), Baba, Nishioka, Oda, Shirakawa, Ueda, and Ugai (2005), 
Kimura, Kobayashi, Muranaga, and Ugai (2003) and Matsukura, Ogawa, and Clark (2007), 
agree that the QEP did not appear to be very successful in achieving its goal of stimulating 
aggregate demand sufficiently and eliminating persistent deflationary pressures. However, 
this does not mean that the QEP provided no economic stimulus to the Japanese economy. 
However, with an overwhelming drag on aggregate spending stemming from severe 
weakness in the banking sector and balance sheet problems among households and firms, 
the impact was limited (Bowman et al., 2011). Nonetheless, there were several ways in which 
the QEP provided stimulus, albeit that such stimulus was limited. Firstly, the BoJ’s outright 
purchases of JGBs exerted downward pressure on long-term interest rates, however, previous 
studies don’t point to significant effects, possibly because these purchases were not significant 
enough volume-wise (Oda & Ueda, 2007).  
Secondly, while committed to maintaining low short-term interest rates until deflation ceased, 
the QEP reduced expected future interest rates, resulting in lower nominal longer-term rates, 
while increasing inflation expectations, and ultimately lowering real interest rates. Studies by 
Okina and Shiratsuka (2004) and Baba et al. (2005) also established that these effects were 
mostly small.  
Thirdly, the QEP increased Japanese banks’ liquidity so that they were likely to extend credit 
to the public, availing more credit to bank-dependent borrowers (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992; 
Kashyap & Stein, 2000). Ugai (2007) noted that while demand for excess reserves fell in most 
developed countries soon after the September 2001 terrorist attack in the US, demand 
remained high in Japan, due to concerns over corporate bankruptcies and falling equity prices. 
Hence, the QEP failed to reverse the decline in bank lending over the period, and neither 
Kimura et al. (2003) nor Ugai (2007) find much effect between the large expansion of Japan’s 
monetary base and the rate of credit growth, further supporting researchers’ claims on the 
limited impacts of the QEP.  
In summary, and according to Bowman et al. (2011), the expansion of reserves in the 
Japanese economy associated with the QEP likely boosted the flow of credit to the economy, 
but over the policy horizon, failed to adequately address the macroeconomic imbalances still 
prevalent in the Japanese economy. Nevertheless, for several reasons, the overall size of the 
credit lift is conceivably small. One reason may be that commercial banks reduced their 
lending to each other, offsetting the effect of reserve injections by the BoJ - therefore, 
commercial bank’s overall liquidity rose by less than their CABs with the BoJ. Another reason 
may be that the impact of extended liquidity on lending only held during the early years of the 
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QEP, when Japan’s banking system was at its weakest, and hence the QEP was most likely 
to have been more helpful, but by 2005, before the BoJ abandoned the QEP, the relationship 
between liquidity and lending in Japan evaporated. The BoJ formally ended the QEP in March 
2006, returning to the overnight call rate as its policy target. However, the BoJ did not actually 
raise the overnight call rate until July 2006, as the BoJ first allowed CABs to be drained. 
By the end of 2006, the Japanese economy still showed signs of weak price pressures as well 
as sluggish economic activity. Although the “medicine” prescribed by the BoJ was better than 
none, despite being unable to turn to traditional policy tools, the central bank re-committed to 
the QEP in 2013. The unconventional policy action of 2013 came in the wake of the 2008 
GFC, and under governor Kuroda, the BoJ promised to unleash a massive programme of 
LSAPs – worth ¥7tn of JGBs each month, using electronically created money, with the aim of 
rekindling demand and upside price pressures. Kuroda describes the BoJ’s renewed QEP 
stance as "monetary easing in an entirely new dimension". However, several years later, price 
pressures in the Japanese economy remain subdued, despite several doses of 
unconventional easing, each one larger than the previous.  
 
2.3 The Fed and unconventional easing 
In December 2008, the Fed lowered the Fed funds rate – the Fed’s traditional MP instrument 
– to virtually zero, in response to the most severe US financial crisis since the great depression 
(later becoming the GFC). The GFC arose out of the over-issue of mortgage bonds and credit 
extension to sub-prime borrowers in the US, and their subsequent default and price slump 
(Neely, 2013). Finance companies packaged sub-prime mortgage bonds and sold them as 
hybrid derivative securities to investors in search of higher yielding assets, other than low 
interest-bearing and more risk-free assets. Since these newly created assets were rated well 
above investment grade, many investors bought into these assets expecting higher returns 
and relatively low-risk exposure. However, the underlying borrowers of these assets defaulted, 
as they were unable to service their debt obligations. This resulted in the value of these 
securities declining significantly, and subsequently, investors holding these assets faced large 
capital losses. Major financial institutions were among the many investors exposed to the 
downside of these assets, which quickly created a systemic liquidity crisis across the US 
financial sector as prices tumbled. Spill-overs from the financial to the real sector resulted 
bringing the US housing market to its knees (Neely, 2013). 
With a failing housing market and a financial sector facing liquidity shortages and systemic 
shocks, like the BoJ, the Fed hit a “wall”, as historically low interest rates were unable to 
stimulate the US economy to check undesirable deflationary pressures and weakening 
aggregate demand, as well as restore liquidity to the financial sector. With conventional MP 
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sitting at the zero-lower bound constraint, the Fed turned to an unconventional MP known as 
LSAPs, or the financial market term, “QE”. As outlined previously, the BoJ pioneered this type 
of unconventional easing some decade ago but showed little to no consistent policy success 
in rebalancing the Japanese economy. Although literature exists by policy makers such as 
Bernanke, Reinhart & Sack (2004), on unconventional policy options when a central bank is 
faced by the zero-lower bound constraint, the Fed was yet to face a scenario where the use 
of unconventional measures was necessary, until the GFC. 
The Fed announced the first LSAP on 25 November 2008, later known as QE1, and expanded 
the programme in March 2009 (Da Costa, 2011). The Fed’s focus was on purchases of 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), issued 
by among others, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks securities 
(Fawley & Neely, 2013). Initially, the Fed purchased $600bn of assets, but in March 2009 
announced further purchases of $750bn in MBSs and $175bn of GSE debt. The first round of 
QE ended on March 31, 2010. 
There were few signs signalling a sufficient economic recovery after QE1. The Fed determined 
that deeper monetary easing was required, and announced its second round of 
unconventional easing, known as QE2, on August 27, 2010. However, the program only began 
on November 3, 2010 and ended on June 30, 2011. During QE2, the Fed purchased $600bn 
of United States of America Treasuries (USTs). The rationale for QE2 was that the Fed was 
concerned that the US economy was recovering too slowly and that there was a genuine 
possibility of disinflation and ultimately, deflation. Thus, the intention of QE2 was to lower long-
term interest rates, with the idea of boosting aggregate demand, while preventing deflation 
(Fawley & Neely 2013). In the summer of 2011, after QE2 ended, there was a hiatus in Fed 
programmes. Additionally, a potential government shutdown after the US Congress failed to 
increase the nation's debt ceiling was a minor drag on the economy. Moreover, economic data 
released over the same period suggests anaemic growth in the US, including persistent high 
unemployment. 
Another headache for the Fed was that in August 2011, the European sovereign debt crisis 
surfaced, alongside Standard & Poor's lowering of the US government’s debt credit rating, 
partly due to the debt ceiling debate, but also as policy makers in the US were unable to agree 
on meaningful spending cuts and revenue increases. Despite the credit rating downgrade of 
US debt, yields fell, as US debt remained reasonably attractive to investors, relative to the 
debt of alternative higher yielding nations (Detrixhe, 2011).  
Following the economic woes mentioned above, the Fed announced the maturity extension 
program on September 21, 2011, known as “Operation Twist” (OT). The objective of this 
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program did not result in the Fed's balance sheet ballooning as in the first two rounds of QE, 
but rather, purchasing longer-term debt (maturity between six and 30 years), and selling 
shorter-term debt (maturity of three years or less). The Fed further reinvested principal 
payments from MBSs and GSE agency debt into MBSs, rather than into USTs. The intention 
of OT was to drive down longer-term interest rates while simultaneously propping up shorter-
term interest rates. On June 20, 2012, OT was extended, with monthly purchases and sales 
of $45bn of securities, before ending in December 2012 (Fawley & Neely, 2013).  
The final round of QE (QE3) was announced on 13 September 2012. The program initially 
began with monthly purchases of MBSs to the amount of $40bn. Simultaneously, OT 
continued but ended in December 2012. The Fed announced that purchases of long-term 
securities would no longer be offset by sales of short-term securities, marking one of the first 
steps by the Fed to reduce its unconventional easing program. In May 2013, the Fed formally 
announced that it would begin to reduce its QE3 program, decreasing its monthly purchases 
of securities, and sparking a market ‘taper tantrum’. The announcement had an immediate 
negative impact on global asset markets, as expectations tilted swiftly to a tighter credit 
environment in the future. The result was a sharp increase in risk-off sentiment towards EM 
assets, prompting capital outflows, as investors considered the implications for future US MP. 
Global markets eventually came to grips with the mildly hawkish stance of the Fed, considering 
the US economy was starting to show signs of a sustainable economic recovery. 
QE3 and the entire LSAP program came to an end at the October 2014 FOMC meeting. Then 
Fed chair Janet Yellen, stated that a substantial improvement in the outlook for the US labour 
market and sufficient underlying strength in the broader US economy would support the on-
going process towards maximum employment in context of price stability, rendering little need 
for sustaining unconventional easing. 
When assessing the impacts of unconventional policy by the Fed in the US, there are many 
studies dedicated to understanding the spill-overs on US financial markets. Specifically, of 
main asset classes, LSAPs are shown to influence bond yields, equity prices, the US dollar, 
capital flows, and risk appetite (Rogers, Scotti, & Wright., 2014). 
Importantly, in terms of bond yields, the effect of LSAPs work through several transmission 
channels as identified by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011). These are:  
(1) a signalling channel that drives down the yield on all bonds (with larger effects on 
intermediate and long-term bonds); 
(2) a long-term safety channel through which yields on medium and long maturity safe 
bonds fall because of a unique clientele for safe nominal assets, and Fed 
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purchases reduce the supply of such assets, and hence increase the equilibrium 
safety premium; and  
(3) an inflation channel, implying larger reductions in real, rather than nominal rates, 
through expected inflationary pressures.  
Gagnon et al (2011) noted the effects of LSAPs on benchmark bond yields during QE1, 
reporting a cumulative decline in the 10-year UST yield of 91 basis points. Furthermore, using 
event study methodology, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) found that QE1 and 
QE2 significantly lowered nominal interest rates on USTs, agency, corporate bonds, and 
MBSs, but with magnitudes that differed across bonds and maturities.  
Based on this evidence, the Fed’s LSAPs lowered longer-term private borrowing rates. While 
the effects were especially noticeable in the mortgage market, they appeared to be 
widespread, including in the market for USTs. The conclusion is promising, as it means that 
MP remains potent even after the zero bound is reached (Gagnon et al., 2011). 
Looking at exchange rate effects, Glick and Leduc’s (2013) study using intra-daily data and 
event study, suggests that the Fed’s unconventional MP has been effective in driving a weaker 
US dollar, with impacts in line with traditional Fed MP. On average, the impact measured at 
roughly a 600pip decline against major currencies, per FOMC announcement, during QE. 
Labonte (2013) realised similar results but focused on the real value of the US dollar, finding 
it declined from March 2009 to July 2013. According to Labonte (2013), the finding was driven 
by interest rate differentials in the US and the rest of the world, through assets such as bonds, 
which declined in attractiveness (lower yields), curtailing capital flows and the demand for US 
dollars. 
US equity prices were also impacted by QE, much to the upside, and to this day, continue to 
benefit from excess liquidity in the US economy, among other factors. U.S equity prices are 
shown to typically respond to news of Fed activity, tending to rise when the Fed 
announces expansionary policy (Kiley, 2014; Chan, 2003). Investor sentiment and the inverse 
relationship between interest rates and equity prices were shown to be a main driver of this 
outcome (Kiley, 2014). 
Furthermore, Swanson (2015) and Christensen and Rudebusch’s (2012) research reveals that 
QE puts downward pressure on longer term interest rates. This damages the returns for 
traditionally safe investments such as USTs and other highly rated bonds. Thus, investors are 
forced into relatively riskier investments to find a better return. According to Kiley (2014), 
investors re-weight their portfolios towards equities, pushing up stock market prices. Kiley 
(2014) also found that equity prices, captured in the Standard and Poors 500 index, increased 
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by 15bps on average, during FOMC announcements regarding QE, and by 540bps throughout 
the entire QE period. 
Additionally, falling interest rates affects publicly listed companies’ decision-making. Lower 
rates equating to lower borrowing costs provide companies with greater incentive to expand 
operations and increase leverage. Fundamental analysis generally holds that business 
expansion is a sign of healthy operations and a positive outlook on future demand, which in 
turn causes stock prices to rise, and simultaneously increases risk taking (Bernanke & Kuttner, 
2005).  
The impacts of tapering, or ending QE, had the opposite market effects to the expansionary 
phases. The degree and persistence of the impacts in the US financial market were mixed, 
however. Short-term money market interest rates rose, alongside longer-dated maturities. The 
US dollar regained some losses, but equity prices continued to rise steadily (Aizenman, Binici 
& Hutchison, 2015).  
In December 2015, moving away from unconventional MP, the Fed decided to increase the 
Fed funds rate target by 25bps from 0.25 percent to 0.50 percent, the first interest rate hike in 
more than a decade. The hike in rates was a result of a sustained improvement in economic 
growth, declining unemployment, and inflationary pressures remaining near the 2 percent 
implicit inflation target. The action taken by the Fed is known as ‘interest rate normalisation’, 
a slow path to returning to previous nominal interest rate levels seen before the GFC. Fed 
officials emphasised their intention to raise rates gradually going forward as macroeconomic 
conditions continued to gain traction. The interest rate outlook in the US evolved steadily after 
the first-rate hike decision, with a steeper yield curve expressing market expectations for 
higher rates in the future. With exception, equity prices in the US remained buoyant, despite 
a negative relationship with increasing interest rates, driven by excess liquidity and other 
factors, such as improving consumer sentiment.  
 
2.4 QE and spill-overs to EMs 
Since the introduction of the Fed’s unconventional MP in late 2008, policy-makers in both AEs 
and EMs have argued that the Fed’s QE programme fostered undue risk-taking and larger 
than usual capital inflows into EMs, contributing to excessively loose financial conditions in 
these countries (Bowman, Londono & Sapriza, 2015). Some EM policy-makers also complain 
of the upward pressure on exchange rates and loss in economic competitiveness (mostly 
through trade) that have resulted from QE policies. Moreover, policy makers have been 
concerned about the risk and economic disruption of capital withdrawal from EMs with the 
process of ending QE and normalising interest rates in the US. However, according to Rajan 
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(2015), the extent of the surge in capital flows and spill-overs generated by QE into and out of 
EMs remains an open question.  
Hence, it is important to note the channels in which QE may affect cross-border capital flows, 
asset prices, and economic activity. 
Portfolio-balancing channel: QE involves the purchase of longer-duration assets 
such as USTs and MBSs. These purchases reduce the supply of such assets to private 
investors, compressing the term premium. In turn, demand for substitute assets, 
including EM assets, increases, as investors turn to riskier assets in search of higher 
expected risk-adjusted returns. Such portfolio rebalancing lowers risk premiums, 
boosts asset prices, and lowers yields in EMs, effectively easing their financial 
conditions. 
Forward guidance channel: The risk-neutral component of bond yields may decline 
as a response of the commitment by the fed to keep the policy rate lower for the 
foreseeable future. Consequently, large interest rate differentials with respect to EMs 
are expected to persist, which, in turn, prompt carry trades and capital flows into EMs. 
Exchange rate channel: The portfolio flows discussed above can result in a 
depreciation of the US dollar against EM currencies. This would act as a drag on US 
demand for foreign-produced goods and services, relative to those produced in the US 
Consequently, EM exports could be negatively affected. 
An analysis by Bowman et al. (2015) shows that QE spill-over effects through the above 
channels are amplified by the differences in the macroeconomic and financial conditions of 
AEs and EMs in the period following the GFC. One example was the type of exchange rate 
regime adopted by the EM country, since EMs with fixed rather than floating exchange rate 
regimes, are impacted significantly harder.  
In assessing the Fed’s unconventional MP on EMs, Bowman et al. (2015) established a 
noteworthy impact on sovereign bond yields in most EMs, including SA. Moreover, the 
estimated effect of MP shocks on sovereign bond yields, like that of Brazil, are larger than the 
effect on UST yields, satisfying portfolio and signalling channels to EMs. Specifically, 
sovereign yields in countries with managed floating currency regimes are more exposed to 
changes in US financial conditions (Hausman & Wongswan, 2011). This is in line with recent 
work by Obstfeld, Ostry and Qureshi (2017), who found that EMs under a flexible exchange 
rate are better positioned to mitigate shocks arising from foreign MP actions than fixed 
exchange rate systems. However, Obstfeld et al. (2017) noted that the type of exchange rate 
system doesn’t insulate EMs from foreign monetary shocks alone, citing domestic economic 
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policy management as just as important in reducing the impact of external shocks. Bauer and 
Neely (2013) investigated the portfolio balancing and forward guidance channels of 
transmission of US QE to international markets. They found that the responses of sovereign 
EM yields to QE announcements largely differed in the average response to US conventional 
MP. 
Like Bowman et al. (2015), there are additional studies that centre their attention around the 
effects of US unconventional MP on EMs. For example, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2011) shed light on the channels in which QE affects interest rates by analysing the 
differential impact of QE on a sample of EM interest rates. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) analysed 
the effects of QE on capital flows and equity prices in EMs, focusing on FOMC policy 
announcements as well as corresponding LSAPs. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) found increasing 
levels of capital flows during expansionary QE phases, and higher equity prices. Fratzscher, 
Lo Duca, and Straub (2012) also explored the spill-over effects of US QE to foreign 
economies, as did Ahmed and Zlate (2013), but focussed mostly on the actual LSAPs rather 
than on FOMC announcements.  
Fratzscher et al. (2012) found that LSAP announcements had more significant effects than 
actual Fed operations on sovereign bond yields and exchange rates, suggesting that investors 
do not fully factor information in Fed announcements. However, Fratzscher et al. (2012) used 
dummy variables to characterise QE announcements, therefore ignoring the expected 
component of these announcements. Using a similar methodology to Hausman and 
Wongswan (2011), Fratzscher et al. (2012) also investigated the heterogeneous exposures to 
US MP. Although they did not find a role for the exchange rate regime, they did establish that 
EMs with more active MP and high-quality institutions were less exposed to US 
unconventional MP shocks. 
Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, and Tong’s (2011) related study in the United Kingdom explored 
how QE affects the gilt market, and how the effect of QE spreads more widely into other 
financial asset prices, such as equities, corporate debt, and the exchange rate. They argue 
that the most timely and clear way to observe the effect of QE on one’s economy is by looking 
at financial market impacts.  
Bouraoui’s (2015) study on the tapering of QE focused specifically on the effects on EMs. 
Bouraoui (2015) established that the tapering of QE in 2013 impacted negatively on the values 
of currencies of five EMs, including SA. By using the event study methodology, significant 
depreciation in exchange rates are recorded, particularly on the day post the ‘taper tantrum’ 
announcement. Furthermore, Bouraoui (2015) notes that event study allows the researcher to 
observe immediate market reactions to the Fed’s MP announcements, and more specifically, 
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to measure abnormality in asset returns as well as the formation of expectations of the event 
outcome. Meanwhile, other studies mostly used vector autoregression (VAR) techniques to 
study the impulse response functions of a system of financial market variables, and in what 
direction they will trend over time. Negatively, VAR estimation is unable to capture market 
pricing behaviour before an event occurs, which is important in assessing how agents’ 
expectations form before an FOMC announcement regarding QE is made. This is because 
poorly anchored expectations can lead to abnormality in asset prices, and ultimately, returns.    
In this light, there is sufficient research to support the notion of spill-over effects to EM assets 
arising from unconventional MP in the US. However, the available research centres around 
analysing a particular financial asset. What is lacking, is research that explicitly explores the 
impacts of the Fed’s LSAPs on the broader SA financial market, through asset classes such 
as bonds, equity prices, and exchange rates, among others. Moreover, there is no research 
available that quantifies the impact of the Fed’s interest rate normalisation in 2014 on SA 
financial markets, which would provide further impetus to this study.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the BoJ’s QEP in Japan, and its impacts on the Japanese economy. 
The literature suggests a limited economy-wide impact, mostly attributable to the low scale 
and low potency of the QEP. The study then turned its attention to the Fed’s unconventional 
MP implemented subsequently to the GFC, the program size, and the impacts thereof. The 
literature highlights relationships between the Fed’s LSAPs and interest rates, the US dollar, 
equity prices, and risk taking. The opposite market impact is observed when tapering of LSAPs 
and normalisation of interest rates is announced, albeit to a lesser degree. Unconventional 
MP spill-overs are also discussed in context of EMs. Similar market impacts seen in the US 
are recorded in EMs, but with volatile outcomes during the ‘taper tantrum’. Through the 
available literature, the rationale supports the basis of this minor-dissertation and the 
methodology used.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology used in this study. The first part of the methodology 
entails a “surprise regression”; a pre-cursor to establish whether a simple link between non-
borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the four SA study variables exists. Following this, the 
second part of the methodology discusses and defines the event study approach, with 
hypotheses defined in order of establishing whether the Fed’s LSAPs exhibit any price 
abnormality in the four SA study variables.  
 
3.2 “Surprise” regression 
Before a primary methodical approach is undertaken to establish whether an empirical 
relationship exists, a simple “surprise” regression can explain if there is a preliminary statistical 
relationship between the Fed’s LSAPs and policy normalisation on SA asset prices. This was 
achieved by analysing the weekly changes of non-borrowed reserves held at the Fed and the 
four SA study variables. By undertaking this study, we sought to establish a relationship before 
the event study was carried out, which leads to a prior being established, if any. This approach, 
in assessing SA financial assets’ reaction to unconventional MP actions and announcements, 
was first estimated by Cook and Hahn (1989) who studied the one-day responsiveness of 
bond rates to changes in the target Fed funds rate from 1974 to 1979. This involved regressing 
the change in the endogenous variable (bond rates-∆𝑌𝑡) on the change of the exogenous 
variable (Fed funds rate-∆𝑋𝑡). This study adopted Cook and Hahn’s (1989) and Kuttner’s 
(2001) approach in estimating a “surprise” regression, defined as: 
 
                                                             ∆𝑌𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                            (3.2.1) 
 
where 𝑋𝑡= the non-borrowed reserves on the balance sheet of the Fed, 𝑌𝑡= one of the four SA 
study variables and ∆= the change in the value of the variable in percent (change between a 
week after and a week before for both the non-borrowed reserves of the Fed and each one of 
the four SA study variables). Four “surprise” regressions are estimated, accounting for each 
SA study variable. Moreover, for this method, our priori is that we expect the ZAR/$US to 
appreciate, the SA 10-year government bond yield to fall (through the search for yield), the 
JSE ALSI to increase in price, (as risk taking increases), and the SA VIX to fall (by increasing 
risk appetite). 
 
The events in this approach were derived from each FOMC announcement regarding the 
expansion and reduction of LSAPs and the normalisation of MP. To test the “surprise” 
regression, and to establish whether there was an empirical link between non-borrowed 
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reserves held by the Fed and the four SA study variables, we used a simple set of hypotheses, 
namely:  
H0: no “surprise” impact 
H1: “surprise” impact 
 
where the null hypothesis (H0) is defined as: no “surprise”. Simply put, changes to non-
borrowed reserves held by the Fed have no “surprise” impact on the four study variables. The 
alternative hypothesis (H1) suggests the opposite, in which changes to non-borrowed reserves 
held by the Fed have a “surprise” impact on the four study variables. 
 
To validate the above, to accept or reject the null hypothesis, the statistical significance of the 
resulting t-statistic coefficient was used, and defined as:  
 
                                                        𝑡 =
𝛽−𝛽0
𝑆𝐸(𝛽)
,  where 𝛽0 = 0                                            (3.2.2) 
 
Where 𝛽=estimated beta of the change in non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and 𝑆𝐸(𝛽)= 
standard error of the sample data. In accounting for a small sample size, and the low ordered 
frequency of the data to be used in the “surprise” regression (weekly), this method relies on a 
10 percent significance level. Hence, if the t-statistic returned is greater than 1.65 in absolute 
terms, with a p-value ≤ 0.10, the coefficient is statistically significant, and the null hypothesis 
is rejected. 
 
Whether the above hypothesis is rejected or not, based on the outcome of this simple 
“surprise” test, the event study approach is still estimated, given that the “surprise” regression 
may not report a significant impact given the lower ordered frequency of the data used in the 
approach. Nonetheless, it is still a viable undertaking.  
 
3.3 Event Study  
Following from Cook and Hahn’s (1989) study, it is clear that understanding how specific 
events impact the workings of financial markets is a growing concern in economics literature, 
and more so in the field of financial economics. To better understand the impact of economic 
events, economists have since used event study methodology when analysing both micro and 
macroeconomic events and their resulting impact on economic variables and entities, such as 
interest rates and company stocks. Dolley (1933), one of the first studies in economics 
literature, used event study to analyse the effect of a stock split on firms. Later studies by 
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Brown and Warner (1985), Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), Duso, Gugler, an Yurtoglu 
(2010), Yoo, Lee, and Heo (2013), and Ashley (1962) also applied event studies to micro level 
events. 
 
Studies on events of a macroeconomic nature, such as changes to MP by central banks, had 
not been analysed until Waud’s (1970) research on the impact of changes to the Fed’s 
targeted interest rate on the Standard and Poors 500 stock index. Waud’s (1970) study fuelled 
further research into the study of MP announcements and their impacts on financial markets. 
Since changes to MP short-term interest rates transmit instantaneously and directly into 
financial markets, analysing the impact thereof gains much importance. Andersen and 
Bollerslev (1998), Jensen and Johnson (1995), and Kuttner’s (1999) studies all measure the 
impact of MP announcements on financial markets using event study. Meanwhile, 
unconventional easing market impacts were assessed using event study by Gagnon et al. 
(2011), Neely (2013), Bouraoui (2015), and Swanson (2016). 
 
Thus, it is evident that event study is becoming a more standardised methodology to study 
market announcements, and their impact on financial markets. This prompted the decision to 
use the event study methodology in this minor dissertation to assess if there were abnormal 
effects associated with the Fed’s LSAPs and normalisation, so that we could quantify the 
significance of these events by the Fed, if any, and their impact on the four SA study variables. 
 
The event study provides an overview into the market reaction of the FOMC announcements 
regarding LSAPs and normalisation - and with new information received - asset price changes 
are reflected immediately if the announcement is not correctly predicted. Whereas, if MP 
actions are correctly predicted, the financial market’s reaction is likely to be captured prior to 
the event to factor in expectations, and remain unchanged on, and following, the event date 
until new market information comes into knowledge. 
 
One of the main advantages of the event study methodology is that it immediately captures 
market behaviour from market related events (Bouraoui, 2015). Reactions can be quantified 
before, on the event date, and following the event, giving a high frequency set of results - a 
result for each day in the event window. This allows researchers to better understand market 
reactions by providing insight into the impact of market announcements.  
 
However, there are disadvantages. Brown and Warner (1980) argued that the event study 
approach depends on a set of assumptions, and if incorrectly specified, lead to inaccurate and 
biasing empirical results. MacKinlay (1997) identified certain issues pertaining to event studies 
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and stated that they should not be taken lightly. Firstly, event study assumes that there are no 
additional significant events around the main events of interest, which would compromise the 
results. To overcome this issue, a short event window is chosen to identify and exclude any 
confounding effects (for the most part, no confounding effects were identified in this study). 
Choosing a short window, due to a possible estimation problem, increases the power of test 
statistics, which in turn increases robustness of inferences made about the significance of an 
event. To avoid the problem of weakening the power of test statistics, the event window should 
be as short as possible, but long enough to capture the significant effect of the event. However, 
a secondary estimation technique can be adopted, should the data not comply with a 
researcher’s notion of the applicable theoretical probability distribution. Non-parametric 
estimation is the secondary option and is a statistical method that allows the functional form 
of a fit to data to be obtained in the absence of any guidance or constraints from theory.  
 
Secondly, identifying the exact date on which the market participants receive new information 
is difficult, especially if there is no reliable history of the events. In this study, the problem was 
immaterial since each FOMC announcement date was pre-scheduled and available as public 
record before the actual event took place.  
 
Data frequency poses another problem, as MacKinlay (1997) argued that low frequency data 
(monthly, annually) lacks increasing power gain in comparison to higher frequency data 
(minute, hourly, daily). MacKinlay (1997) further argued that there is substantial payoff in terms 
of increasing power gain from increasing the frequency of the data used (in the estimated 
event study, daily data was used to increase the power gain of the results). 
 
Lastly, the sample size has important implications on the empirical distribution of the results. 
The test statistic in the event study is based on the assumption of normality - associated with 
large data samples. But, in the absence of meeting normality criteria, a researcher still has the 
option of using a non-parametric estimation, even with overlapping events. This study met the 
minimum requirement for normality, using an estimation window of 25 days and an event 
window of five days, in total, a 30-day period, which is in line with the minimum as suggested 
by the central limit theorem. According to Gujurati (1988:90), even if the population distribution 
is strongly non-normal, its sampling distribution of means will be approximately normal for a 
sample size of at least 30 observations.   
3.4 Defining the event study approach 
Since the events of interest have now been identified as FOMC announcements pertaining to 
LSAPs and normalisation by the Fed, in which all events are included even if no changes are 
made to the LSAP programme or normalisation by the Fed at each event, in this study, we 
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assume that market participants already know that the announcement is to take place 
considering the communication by the Fed on the direction in which MP were to take following 
the GFC. Exception is made for the first announcement relating to LSAPs, as this came as a 
surprise to market participants as the Fed exhausted traditional MP tools. Thereafter, clear 
communication was published for public access, as well as future FOMC dates.  
 
In assessing the impact of LSAPs and normalisation through FOMC announcements, a 
measure of the AR was necessary. The AR is the actual ex post value (or market value) of the 
financial asset over the event window, minus the normal return of the financial asset over the 
estimation window. The normal return value is the value (or market value) that would be 
expected if the event did not take place. 
 
For each variable i and event date t, we have:  
 
                                                      𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − E[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡|]                                               (3.4.1) 
                                                             𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡     ~ N (0, σ
2) 
 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the abnormal return, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the actual ex post return, E[𝑅𝑖𝑡  |𝑋𝑡|] is the expected 
normal return for event i at time t. 𝑋𝑡 is the conditioning information for the normal return model. 
ARs are assumed to be normally, independent and identically distributed N ~ (IID), and 
represent the unexpected errors of the expected return model with mean zero and a constant 
variance. Therefore, the normal return is defined as the expected return without conditioning 
on the FOMC announcement taking place. For each FOMC announcement by the Fed relating 
to LSAPs and normalisation, we estimated equation 3.4.2, which defined the surprise to FOMC 
announcements as a function of the changes to LSAPs and normalisation by the Fed, which 
is estimated as: 
 
                                                     E[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡|] =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                           (3.4.2) 
𝜀𝑡 ~ N (0, σ
2) 
 
where E[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡|] represents the expected return associated to FOMC announcements, as 
given by the daily changes of the four SA study variables at time t. 𝑅𝑡 is the actual change of 
each study variable,  𝛼 and 𝛽 are parameters to be estimated, and 𝜀𝑡 is the error term at time 
t and is assumed to be normal with mean zero and constant variance, as well as IID. Our priori 
in this method is that expected and actual returns are a zero-sum, implying no abnormal 
returns are achievable, given agents accurately predict MP outcomes.  
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What is important, is the effect arising from FOMC announcements on QE and normalisation 
in this analysis, given by the response of the 𝛽 coefficient and the associated explanatory 
power of FOMC announcements on the FOMC announcement surprises.  
 
Assuming the actions taken by the Fed are predictable, such that market participants know 
beforehand the decisions the Fed will take with respect to LSAPs and normalisation, the 
announcements should be little to no surprise (no AR), and the four SA study variables should 
not change in response to the announcements made by the Fed. However, large ARs of the 
four SA study variables would suggest otherwise, implying that evidence exists that the Fed’s 
decisions on LSAPs and normalisation are unpredictable, since market participants fail to form 
accurate expectations based on public knowledge before the event occurs. Alternatively, low 
or non-existent abnormality in the returns of the four study variables suggests that the Fed’s 
actions are credible, clear, and transparent. This would mostly allow market participants to 
form accurate expectations of the Fed’s decisions before the event transpires, from publicly 
available information. Bear in mind, that as clear as the Fed’s communication on 
unconventional MP may be, the expectation’s channel of MP may not function as usual. During 
unconventional MP periods, market participants struggle to accurately predict future policy 
action with consistency, leaving alternative expectations to form, ones that may not materialise 
(Okina & Shiratsuka, 2004; Eichengreen & Gupta, 2015; Wu & Xia, 2016). 
 
Unlike a market return model, where a financial asset’s return is conditioned on the market’s 
return, in this study, the normal return is modelled on a constant mean return whereby Xt is a 
constant. Once a normal return model is selected, defining the estimation window is the next 
process. Usually, the period before the event window is chosen as the estimation window. The 
event window is not included in the estimation window, to prevent the event from having undue 
influence over the normal return model parameter estimates (MacKinlay, 1997).  
 
By obtaining the normal return model parameter estimates, we can calculate the ARs, such 
that the normal and ARs are observed within two windows (time periods), as shown in the 
figure hereunder. 
Figure 3.3.1: Time line structure of an event study methodology 
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Source: Cai, 2008 
 
T = 0 is the event date, T0 to T1 is the estimation window, T1 to T2 is the event window (explicitly 
defined asT1 + 1 ≤ 0 ≤ T2). L1 = T1 – T0 and L2 = T2 − T1 are the length of the estimation and 
event window. Analysis of a post-event window is excluded in this study as an overlap of 
estimation and event windows will occur. Note that if the event under examination is an 
announcement on a specific date, it is acceptable to set the event window length longer than 
a single day so that the use of ARs around the event day is used. It is also acceptable for the 
estimation and event window not to overlap so that unbiased estimators or the parameters of 
the normal return model are delivered, uninfluenced by the returns during and around each 
specific event. 
 
MacKinlay (1997) states that the inclusion of the event window in the normal return model 
estimation can lead to event returns exerting a significantly large impact on the normal return 
measure. This leads to both the normal return and AR to capture a degree of event impact 
that poses a problem, as event study methodology was developed on the notion that each 
event impact is captured by ARs only. Therefore, the estimation window for each specific event 
includes all the days before the start of the event window so that no overlap with subsequent 
event windows occurs. For example, suppose that two FOMC announcement dates are 15 
January and 15 March 2010. For the second date, 15 March 2010, the event window will 
include three days prior to the event, the actual event date, and one day after the event. The 
estimation window will include all days prior to the event window, but not any days that would 
overlap with the previous event’s window, that being centred around 15 January 2010. Thus, 
the estimation window will only start after the previous event window is concluded and will end 
as the second event window begins. This allows the AR to be strictly calculated, without any 
undue influence during the event window. 
 
Thereafter, a framework was designed to test the statistical significance of ARs. Importantly, 
it is necessary to define the null hypothesis and determine the techniques to aggregate each 
event’s individual ARs. Presenting the empirical results must follow from the development of 
the econometric design. Since the study is interested in the significance of the FOMC 
announcements by the Fed for each event date, it is important to aggregate across the days 
within the event window (-3, -2, -1, 0, 1) to ensure the overall significance of the event was 
realised. Rahman and Mohsin (2011) say that aggregation can be carried out in two ways, 
these being: cross-sectional aggregation; and time-series aggregation. Cross-sectional 
aggregating is relevant when a single event impacts several variables, or, multiple firms. This 
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is normally to establish if a specific event had an impact across multiple variables or, as stated, 
multiple firms. Aggregated returns are defined as: 
 
                                                    CARi (T1, T2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
                                            (3.4.3) 
 
where CARi is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of FOMC announcement i, from L2 = T2 
− T1, which is previously defined as the event window. By aggregating ARs with this method, 
it is possible to establish if accumulated returns around the event window are normally 
distributed. This allows the analysis to draw an overall inference on the event of interest. Since 
there are multiple sampling intervals within the event window, using CAR to aggregate is a 
further motivation. Under the null and alternate hypothesis: 
 
H0: µ = 0 
H1: µ ≠ 0 
where µ refers to the CAR as in 3.4.3, the CAR should not be statistically significant and 
different to zero, suggesting that FOMC announcements have no impact on the four SA study 
variables, such that: 
                                                  CARi ~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀𝑡
2 )                                                           (3.4.4) 
 
If the CAR does not follow the distribution above, then the null hypothesis is rejected, and the 
event has an abnormal impact on the four SA study variables. 
 
3.5 Developing and testing a hypothesis 
In addition to the abovementioned, in ascertaining if an abnormal impact is present, resulting 
from FOMC announcements by the Fed on the four SA study variables, by means of event 
study, it is only noteworthy if the calculated ARs are statistically significant and different from 
zero. Thus, it is necessary to design a set of hypotheses that can be tested empirically. These 
hypotheses allow us to investigate whether ARs following Fed FOMC announcements are 
present and statistically significant.  
For this set of hypotheses, the null hypothesis (H0) is defined as: the given event has no impact 
on the mean return. Simply put, FOMC announcements by the Fed regarding LSAPs and 
normalisation of MP have no abnormal impact on each one of the four SA study variables. 
The alternative hypothesis (H1) suggests the opposite, in which the Fed’s FOMC 
announcements have a significant impact on the four SA study variables.  
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To reject H0 in favour of the alternate, H1, the decision must be based on a relevant test statistic 
or criterion. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it will mean that there is significant statistical 
evidence that ARs are a result of the Fed’s FOMC announcements pertaining to LSAPs and 
normalisation of MP. 
If the test statistic/criterion result indicates otherwise, whereby no statistically significant AR is 
observed, then the Fed’s FOMC announcements have no impact on the four SA study 
variables.  
The null and alternate hypotheses are defined as: 
H0: µ = 0 
H1: µ ≠ 0 
Here, µ refers to the CAR as in 3.4.3. The main empirical investigation in this study is to 
statistically test µ, if the four SA study variables react to the Fed’s FOMC announcements 
pertaining to LSAPs and normalisation of MP.  
In this case, it is assumed that: 
µ ~𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝜀𝑡
2 )                                             
From this point, the study used two parametric test statistics, known as J1 and J2, to confirm 
the significance of the event study. According to Cai (2008), J1 and J2 are defined as 
parametric tests used in testing the overall significance of the CARs. If there is doubt of a CAR 
variance bias arising from AR aggregating, using J2 as the test statistic becomes more 
suitable, because the J2 correction factor allocates higher weight to lower variance 
observations.  
As is evident in MacKinlay (1997) and Cai (2008), both J1 and J2 are related to distortions in 
the variance of aggregated parameters of the AR (like that of the CAR). J2 identifies the 
significance of the CAR when researchers are unsure if the variances of ARs are constant 
across time, thus, examining the robustness of the ARs variances. The correction factor found 
in the J2 test allocates more weight to FOMC announcements which have low variance. If the 
real value of ARs are larger for periods with higher variance, the better choice will then give 
equal weight to the realised CAR of each FOMC announcement.  
The variance of CARs within each event window is defined by the test statistic J1, presented 
below: 
                                                  J1 = =
 CARi (𝑇1,𝑇2) 
√Var (CARi (𝑇1,𝑇2))
 ~𝑁 (0,1)                                        (3.5.1) 
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where                               Var (CARi (T1, T2)) = 𝜎CARi 
2 = 
1
𝐿1
 ∑ (𝑇1 𝑡=𝑇0+1 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)
2                       (3.5.2)   
                               
Test statistic J2 uses a new method of aggregating the ARs, which is denominated as the 
standardised CAR (Cai, 2008), known as the SCAR, defined below: 
 
                                                     SCARi (T1, T2) = 
 CARi (𝑇1,𝑇2) 
√Var (CARi (𝑇1,𝑇2))
                                (3.5.3) 
 
And with large sample sizes (N), the SCARi (T1, T2), has a mean of zero and a variance:  
 
                                                                  𝜎SCARi 
2 = √(
𝑁 (𝐿1−4)
(𝐿1−2)
)                                                      (3.5.4) 
 
which defines J2 as: 
        J2 = √(
𝑁 (𝐿1−4)
(𝐿1−2)
) 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 (𝑇1, 𝑇2) ~𝑁 (0,1)        
To test the null hypothesis, in empirically establishing statistical significance of each FOMC 
announcement and their impact thereof, J1 and J2 are tested using a significance level of five 
percent. If the coefficient of either J1 or J2 is statistically significant, then the null hypothesis 
is rejected. 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter, the methodology for this minor-dissertation was explored. The methodology 
consisted of two empirical tests, the “surprise” regression and the event study, with the former 
responsible for establishing a priori relationship between the Fed’s non-borrowed reserves, 
and the four SA study variables. The event study approach outlines the test for whether the 
Fed’s LSAPs and interest rate normalisation exhibit any abnormality on the four SA study 
variables. 
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Chapter 4: Data  
4.1 Introduction  
With the methodology for this study clearly defined in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 describes the 
sources of the data that were used throughout this study, as well as any relevant 
transformation that is imposed on the data to make better, more accurate inferences from the 
results.  
 
4.2 Data for descriptive purposes 
Daily data (the highest frequency available for this study) for the descriptive analysis was 
collected over the period 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2015. This period covers the 
beginning and end of the Fed’s QE program, as well as the first interest rate hike by the Fed, 
post the GFC, in pursuing its path to policy normalisation. Data for the following variables: the 
ZAR/$US, the JSE ALSI, the SA 10-year government bond yield and the SA VIX were 
collected from Bloomberg. Data for non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed were collected 
from the St Louis Fed FRED database over the same period. However, for this data, the 
highest frequency readily available is weekly.  
 
The data specifically in relation to the descriptive analysis, defining the dates of QE1, QE2, 
and QE3, was collected from Kavli and Viegi’s (2015) research. This data was depicted in 
each variable (see Chapter 5) to analyse the visual impact of QE phases on the variables in 
question. Since the descriptive analysis is simply to observe trends that have formed because 
of the Fed’s LSAPs and normalisation of MP, the differing frequencies between non-borrowed 
reserves held by the Fed and the four SA study variables was not of high concern and 
therefore, sufficed for the descriptive analysis.   
 
4.3 Data - “surprise” regression 
The surprise regression was estimated using the same data collected over the same period 
and frequency as the rolling window correlation, as per the above.  
 
4.4 Data - rolling window correlation 
For the rolling window correlation analysis, weekly data for non-borrowed reserves held by the 
Fed as well as for the four SA study variables was collected over the period 1 January 2008 
to 31 December 2015 from the St Louis Fed FRED database and Bloomberg, respectively.  
 
4.5 Data - event study 
Again, for the event study, data was collected from Bloomberg over the same period as above, 
but in daily frequency, for the four SA study variables. Ideally, higher frequency data (example: 
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hours or minutes, etc.) provides better identification of shocks, if any, resulting from event 
announcements. However, due to the availability of data, daily data was used as the highest 
frequency available and was sufficient in providing robust results pre-and-post event 
announcements. Alternatively, lower frequency data (e.g. weekly) may not capture the impact 
of event announcements, 
 
Additionally, because of time zone differences between the US and SA financial markets, 
where the US lags in time (Washington D.C., where FOMC announcements are made, by 
approximately six hours hours), an event may not show an immediate transmission or shock 
and may only show an impact the following trading day, resulting in higher abnormality 
proceeding an event.  
 
Lastly, dates defining the Fed’s FOMC meetings in which QE and interest rate normalisation 
were mentioned, were collected from the Fed’s FOMC minutes, and defined as the events of 
interest in the “surprise” regression, and event study. There were 57 events of interest, 
beginning December 2008 and ending December 2015. 
 
4.5.1 Defining the event study windows 
The window length for the estimation window was 25 days from T0 to T1. This allowed for the 
estimation window to be uninfluenced by the event of interest and to generate a fair normal 
return of the variable tested, given that a longer window would overlap with other events of 
interest. On the other hand, the event window length was five days from T1 + 1 ≤ 0 ≤ T2 as 
previously suggested in Chapter 3. Unlike Gagnon et al. (2011) and Neely (2013), who used 
a short event window to analyse the effect of LSAPs (one day around the announcement 
date), in this study, the event window was extended around the announcement date, partially 
due to the inability to access data of a frequency higher than daily data. 
 
4.6 Data transformation – “surprise” regression and event study 
To estimate the “surprise” regression, weekly returns of the non-borrowed reserves held by 
the Fed as well as the four SA study variables had to be calculated. For the event study, only 
the SA study variables daily return was calculated. This was achieved by taking the natural 
log difference:  
 
                                                               (𝐿𝑛 
𝑋𝑡
𝑋𝑡−1
) ∗ 100                                                     (4.6.1) 
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where 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡−1 = changes over a weekly frequency for the five variables in the “surprise” 
regression. In the event study, 𝑋𝑡 and 𝑋𝑡−1 = changes over a daily frequency for the four SA 
study variables at time t and t-1. 
 
The weekly and daily returns were obtained from this transformation and were represented in 
percentages. Importantly, for the event study, the transformation was essential as we sought 
to establish any ARs among the SA study variables, resulting from FOMC announcements. 
Additionally, this transformation aided in the ease of interpreting the results of both the 
“surprise” regression and event study in “return”. 
 
4.7 Converting percentage to basis points 
One study variable, the 10-year SA bond yield, was reported in percentage (yield) from the 
data source. For the estimation of both the “surprise” regression and the event study, the SA 
10-year bonds' yield was converted to basis points after calculating the weekly and daily 
returns, by the following:   
 
                                                            𝑋𝑡*100= Basis points                                                (4.7.1) 
 
where 𝑋𝑡 = 10-year bond yield at time t. Because the yield was already expressed as a 
percentage, it was important not to infer percentage changes on percentage values to avoid 
any errors that may have arisen in the estimation results.  
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Chapter 5: Descriptive analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 explained the data sources and the transformations applied to the data that were 
used throughout this study. However, the descriptive analysis required no transformation and 
was collected from the relevant data sources. The descriptive analysis aids in providing a 
simple analysis of the trends and movements in non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and 
the four SA study variables during the Fed’s LSAPs and normalisation of MP. Furthermore, 
this analysis provides a rolling window correlation study which highlighted strong, co-moving 
events on an FOMC announcement date and each one of the four SA study variables to 
provide further evidence of a possible causal relationship.  
 
5.2 Non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed 
Figure 5.2 below shows the increase in the Fed’s balance sheet for non-borrowed reserves 
following the undertaking of unconventional MP. A sharp increase is seen during QE1 as the 
Fed purchased $100 billion in GSE direct obligations and up to $500 billion in MBSs by the 
end of 2008. The increase in the Fed’s balance sheet was further fuelled by purchasing $750 
billion of MBSs, $300 billion of longer-term treasuries, and $100 billion in agency debt towards 
the latter part of 2009.  
 
Figure 5.2 Non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed 
 
Source: St Louis Fed and author’s own data 
 
After QE1, further monetary easing came in the form of QE2 as the Fed had added $600 billion 
in long-term treasury securities by the end of QE2 in 2011. Then Fed chairman Bernanke, 
implemented OT, a $400 billion programme in which the Fed used the proceeds from maturing 
UST short-term bills to buy longer-term (six to 30 years) UST notes and bonds. This exerted 
further downward pressure on long-term yields in the US to encourage increased credit 
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demand and consumption by households. The final QE phase started in late 2012 with QE3, 
adding $85 billion of MBSs and USTs purchased monthly, and notably, purchases were of a 
significantly smaller monetary value. As the Fed’s LSAP program restored vast amounts of 
liquidity to both US and global markets alike, the unconventional policy measure slowed in 
May 2013, as the FOMC stated that LSAPs would taper off (subsequently slow down). The 
decision to ease the pace of LSAPs was partly due to a revision in expectations of improved 
economic activity driving both the labour market and favourable inflation outcomes towards 
the Fed’s targets for unemployment and inflation of 2 percent. However, the Fed committed to 
leaving the Fed’s fund rate at 0 percent until the end of 2015 to ensure that policy remained 
accommodative. Finally, in December 2015, the Fed hiked interest rates by 25bps as part of 
its normalisation path, conditioned on a sustained improvement in unemployment and price 
growth nearing its 2percent target.  
 
5.3 The ZAR/$US exchange rate 
The GFC exacerbated volatility of the ZAR/$US with the local currency almost reaching R12/$ 
(a high at the time). Excess liquidity stemming from the Fed’s LSAPs channelled capital flows 
into SA, and in turn, put downward pressure on the local currency, pulling down the rand to 
new lows, last seen in the mid 2000’s. It was evident that during QE1 that the rand steadily 
appreciated from a level of R10/$ to R7/$ in just over a year. As more capital flowed in from 
the US and other developed countries, more local currency was demanded. However, at the 
same time, China’s economy continued to grow rapidly and subsequently increased their 
demand and consumption for commodities (known as the commodities super cycle). With SA 
being a large commodity exporting country, the boom in commodities demand added further 
downward pressure on the rand, ensuring a sizeable appreciation of the local currency. 
 
Figure 5.3 ZAR/$US spot exchange rate 
 
Source: Bloomberg and author’s own data 
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During QE2, the rand traded between levels of R6.80/$US and R8.20/$US and even reached 
an eight year low of R6.59/$US, showing relative stability during this QE phase. During OT, 
the rand began to weaken, especially at the start of OT, losing some 17 percent from 9 
September to 22 September 2013. Whilst the rand pulled back some losses during OT, the 
local currency trades weaker at around R8.20/$US, setting the stage for the sustained 
depreciation of the rand throughout QE3. Even with the continued LSAPs by the Fed, the rand 
began to depreciate modestly against the US dollar, further exacerbated during the so-called 
‘taper tantrum’ of 2013, where the rate of LSAPs slowed, leading to a change in expectations 
of the Fed potentially raising interest rates and the US economy improving employment and 
price levels.  
 
Through this period and into the latter part of 2015, the rand lost its entire nominal appreciation 
from the initial LSAP programs and weakened to a level between R13.00/$US and 
R15.00/$US. Although, this large depreciation was not solely driven by a slowdown in the 
Fed’s LSAPs, but by idiosyncratic factors too, such as the end of the commodities super cycle, 
some risk-off sentiment towards SA, and from political uncertainty that had negative impacts 
on the rand’s value.  
 
5.4 SA 10-year government bond yield 
SA’s long-term interest rate is an important factor in determining longer term investment and 
consumption decisions. The higher the long-term rate, the less investment and consumption 
expenditure is likely to take place. This is because longer term decisions are anchored against 
the long-term interest rate.  
 
Figure 5.4 below shows how the SA 10-year government bond yield immediately declined at 
the start of QE1. With falling long-term interest rates in the US, long-term rates in SA were 
considered a higher interest-yielding asset. Capital was re-directed into local bond markets, 
and into the popular and highly liquid SA 10-year government bond yield, putting upward 
pressure on bond prices and resulting in lower yields.  
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Figure 5.4 SA 10-year government bond yield 
 
Source: Bloomberg and author’s own data 
 
The yield on the SA 10-year government bond experienced a degree of upward pressure 
during QE1, but later retreats to around 8 percent despite reaching a low of 7 percent. Much 
of the same was seen during QE2, where the yield followed a similar trend, but settled lower, 
around 7.86 percent. OT began in late 2011 and was yield positive, following a steady 
downward trend, reaching a yield of around 7.29 percent before the start of QE3. During QE3, 
the yield on the SA 10-year government bond fell further as pressure continued to drive the 
yield lower, in fact, to a study period low of 6.77 percent. However, the yield at this level did 
not last long, and quickly reversed as the mid-2013 ‘taper tantrum’ caused the SA 10-year 
government bond yield to climb by 160bps in a little over two months. 
 
Post the ‘taper tantrum’, the SA 10-year government bond yield traded weaker between the 8 
percent and 9 percent range and spiked again following the axing of ex-finance minister 
Nhlanhla Nene in late 2015, which saw the yield soar above 10 percent. Unfortunately, the 
Fed’s 25bps increase to the Fed funds rate occurred at a similar time to the axing of the ex-
finance minister, and noise in the local bond market made it difficult to analyse any resulting 
yield movements. Even so, it is now evident that the Fed’s LSAPs, which put downward 
pressure on long-term interest rates in the US had similar reaching impacts on SA’s long-term 
interest rates. Thus, if long-term bond rates in the US are to rise, we expect a rise in SA long-
term interest rates as demand and portfolio rebalancing takes place across sovereign fixed 
income assets. 
 
5.5 The JSE ALSI 
The JSE ALSI has climbed higher in the wake of the Fed’s QE programme, edging upwards 
towards new highs during each QE phase. Immediately after QE1, the JSE ALSI increased, 
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and rose steadily to around 30 000 index points by the end of this LSAP program. At this level, 
the JSE ALSI had almost recovered its losses experienced in the latter part of 2008 following 
the fallout of global asset prices. The rally in the local equity market continued throughout QE2 
but lost some traction towards the end of this LSAP program. At this point, OT came into the 
picture, and the momentum in local equity prices was restored as the JSE ALSI reached a 
new, all-time high, of around 35 000 index points. 
 
Figure 5.5 JSE ALSI  
 
Source: Bloomberg and author’s own data 
 
The JSE ALSI continued its climb as QE3 fuelled further momentum in local equity prices. 
Local equity prices slumped momentarily during the ‘taper tantrum’, but unlike the rand and 
10-year bond yield, the slump was short-lived, and prices edged higher for the remainder of 
QE3. Perhaps this was because the depreciation of the rand during the ‘taper tantrum’ 
effectively lowered the cost of SA assets. This meant that equity prices were cheaper, 
providing a catalyst for their continued rise after the fact. From the data provided in Figure 5.5 
above, it is evident that LSAPs contributed to equity price growth in SA as excess liquidity was 
channelled into higher yielding assets outside the US. Only later in 2013 did the JSE ALSI 
taper off somewhat but still proceeded to new highs through 2014 and 2015.  
 
5.6 The SA VIX 
Based on the JSE’s Top 40 Index (the largest 40 companies by market capitalisation), the SA 
VIX peaked in 2008 following the GFC. Despite this, the Fed’s LSAPs, which helped restore 
liquidity to the US, other AEs and EM financial markets put financial market participants at 
ease somewhat by ‘ensuring’ the availability of liquidity, resulting in declining global risk 
perceptions. This was evident in SA as the local volatility index declined significantly during 
QE1. By the end of this QE phase, the SA VIX was some 65 percent lower than before.  
15000
25000
35000
45000
55000
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
In
d
ex
 p
o
in
ts
QE1 QE2 QE3 OT 25bps interest rate hike JSE ALSI
33 
 
Figure 5.6 SA VIX 
 
Source: Bloomberg and author’s own data 
 
The SA VIX was mostly stable during QE2, but a sharp climb in local volatility emerged ahead 
of OT. Interestingly, this climb in volatility correlated to the decline in the JSE ALSI during the 
same period. Noting that as the JSE ALSI’s momentum persisted upwards during both OT 
and QE3, local volatility recorded a downward trend through OT and QE3. Since the SA VIX 
measures volatility of the top 40 companies listed on the JSE ALSI, volatility was expected to 
fall as asset prices on the local exchange increased. The Fed’s LSAPs helped ensure that 
domestic volatility ticked back to pre-GFC levels, despite LSAPs having ended and 
normalisation of interest rates beginning. 
 
Importantly, each SA study variable was notably weaker/lower prior to LSAPs taking place. 
The rand was at a level of R11.60/$ prior to QE1 and subsequently appreciated to around 
R9.50/$ after QE1. The 10-year bond yield was close to 10.5 percent and fell more than 
300bps to around 7 percent. The JSE ALSI faced a sharp price decline and dropped to 
approximately 18500 points. The JSE ALSI then recovered to 22000 points just after the 
announcement of QE1. Domestic volatility was around 58 index points, following global 
liquidity shortages arising from the US financial market turmoil. Soon after QE1, the SA VIX 
was around 43 index points and declining. All SA study variables were noticeably affected by 
the Fed’s LSAPs, with differing degrees of impact. Most notably though is the impact from the 
Fed’s LSAPs, which leave higher local equity prices in place and lower local volatility, 
compared to a weak rand and a higher SA 10-year government bond yield.  
 
We move forward to further analyse the impact of the Fed’s LSAPs and normalisation 
announcements. A rolling window correlation analysis was carried out to establish which 
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FOMC meeting dates correlate between non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and each 
one of the four SA study variables. 
  
5.7 Rolling window correlation analysis 
The rolling window correlation analysis measured the correlation between non-borrowed 
reserves held by the Fed and each of the four SA study variables, over a 32-week rolling 
window period. The rolling window correlation was defined as: 
 
                           𝜎12,𝑡(𝑛) =
1
𝑛−1
∑ (𝑦1𝑡−𝑖 − 𝑢1𝑡−1(𝑛))(𝑦2𝑡−1 − 𝑢2𝑡(𝑛))
𝑛−𝐼
𝑖=0
                                (5.7.1) 
 
                                                       𝑝12,𝑡(𝑛) =
𝜎12,𝑡(𝑛)
𝜎1,𝑡(𝑛)𝜎2,𝑡(𝑛)
                                                  (5.7.2)                                                            
 
 
where n= 32 weeks, 𝑌1 = non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and 𝑌2 =  each one of the 
four SA study variables. 𝜎12,𝑡(𝑛) =  is the 32-week rolling window covariance, and 𝑝12,𝑡(𝑛) = 
32-week rolling window correlation coefficient.  
 
Next, and importantly, the rolling window correlation aided in identifying events that showed 
significant correlation spikes across FOMC events. This allowed us to deduce the strength of 
how close non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and each of the four SA study variables 
moved together by the resulting correlation coefficient. Hence, the rolling correlation study 
extended the descriptive analysis, by assessing a simple co-moving relationship, if any, with 
respect to non-borrowed reserves and the four SA study variables.  
 
However, the study strictly focuses on correlation spikes at or above a threshold of 0.7, to 
identify events that may have a stronger impact than others on each study variable. This 
assisted in moving forward, corroborating results between the correlation analysis and the 
event study methodology, should these specific spikes suggest only a handful of events were 
significant. Even so, since correlation does not imply causality, the event study is approached 
openly, in the sense that all events had the possibility of being significant or insignificant, until 
empirically tested.  
 
5.7.1 Non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the ZAR/$US 
Looking at the rolling correlation between non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the 
ZAR/$US below, numerous spikes of correlation between the two variables are evident.  
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Figure 5.7.1 Rolling correlation between non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the 
ZAR/$US 
 
Source: St Louis Fed, Bloomberg and author’s own data 
 
Notably, there were 15 spikes at or above the 0.7 threshold, more than any other study 
variable. Intuitively, the ZAR is likely to respond to global economic shocks more quickly than 
the other three study variables. This is because it is highly liquid, trades globally, and is 
necessary to transact with when purchasing locally denominated financial assets. 
 
Looking at the events that were at or above our threshold, events: 4, 11, 20, 21 30, 31, 32, 33, 
34, 36, 37, 38, 51, 53, and 54 all show correlation coefficients of 0.7 and higher.  
 
5.7.2 Non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the SA 10-year government bond yield 
The rolling correlation between non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the SA 10-year 
government bond yield exhibited the second highest number of spikes among the four 
variables tested, at or above a correlation coefficient of 0.7. 
 
Figure 5.7.2 Rolling correlation between non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the SA 
10-year government bond yield 
 
Source: St Louis Fed, Bloomberg and author’s own data 
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In addition to a highly liquid asset like the ZAR and knowing that LSAPs prompted investors 
to search for higher yielding assets in countries other than in the US and other AEs, the SA 
10-year government bond yield was the second most responsive, with 14 significant 
correlation spikes. The SA 10-year government bond yield has shown to co-move with non-
borrowed reserves on event 5, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 31, 33, 34, 37, 51, 52, 53, and 54, all 
displaying correlation coefficients of 0.7 and higher.  
 
5.7.3 Non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the JSE ALSI 
The number of events that resulted in correlation spikes at or above the threshold with respect 
to non-borrowed reserves and the JSE ALSI were one less than that of the SA 10-year 
government bond yield. 
Figure 5.7.3 Rolling correlation between non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the 
JSE ALSI 
 
Source: St Louis Fed, Bloomberg, and the author’s own data 
 
This shows that both major asset classes (bonds and equities) exhibited a similar number of 
co-moving events. Moreover, domestic equity prices increased during periods of the Fed’s 
LSAPs (seen in the descriptive analysis) and considering that the level of implied domestic 
equity market risk was decreasing (shown by the decline in the SA VIX), the correlation spikes 
between non-borrowed reserves and the JSE ALSI may also imply that investors sought 
exposure to equities too, and not just bonds (less-risky assets). 
 
In terms of events, events 4, 5, 6, 12, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 all show correlation 
coefficients of 0.7 and higher. 
 
5.7.4 Non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the SA VIX 
Lastly, the SA VIX showed the fewest spikes at or above the threshold. Events 4, 11, and 32 
all displayed correlation coefficients of 0.7 and higher. Sharing event 4 with the ZAR/$US and 
the JSE ALSI, and event 11 with the ZAR/$US and 10-year bond yield, the SA VIX in general 
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did not show many events with high degrees of correlation with non-borrowed reserves held 
by the Fed. 
Figure 5.7.4 Rolling correlation between non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the    
SA VIX 
 
Source: St Louis Fed, Bloomberg, and the author’ s own data 
 
This may be because the SA VIX is a local measure of volatility and is more likely to show 
strong correlation with domestic market events, over and above international market events. 
However, further analysis of the SA VIX relationship with LSAPs was implored going forward 
to make clearer inferences.  
 
The rolling window correlation analysis revealed that there was a significant amount of 
correlation spikes between non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and the four SA study 
variables, when plotted against the FOMC announcement events. The ZAR/$US showed the 
most, with 15 spikes, followed by the SA 10-year bond with 14 spikes, the JSE ALSI with 13 
spikes; and the SA VIX with just three spikes. There were also co-movements between study 
variables for events, where one or more study variable recorded a correlation spike on the 
same event, such as event 4, 5, 11, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the descriptive analysis sought to identify a relationship between non-borrowed 
reserves held by the Fed and the four SA study variables via a simple descriptive and rolling 
window correlation analysis. Visual information about the trends and movements of the four 
study variables over the study period were shown, where the SA study variables exhibited a 
relationship with non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed. Furthermore, spikes in the rolling 
window correlation provided additional support of a possible relationship between the four 
study variables and the Fed’s LSAPs. These spikes, or rather, FOMC announcements, are 
assessed for significance in the following chapter.  
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While noting that correlation does not imply causation, despite a series of FOMC 
announcement events being identified as correlation spikes, further strengthening the priori, 
the significance of estimating whether a causal relationship exists, increases, as descriptive 
evidence suggests that such a relationship might exist. With that said, empirical testing of a 
causal relationship is undertaken in the next chapter by estimating both a “surprise” regression 
and event study methodology.  
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Chapter 6: Empirical results 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 discussed the descriptive analysis of spill-overs to SA from the Fed’s LSAPs and 
normalisation of the MP. This lead to establishing a priori relationship between the variables. 
However, the descriptive analysis alone was not sufficient to establish whether a causal 
relationship exists (despite the likelihood of one existing by observing the evidence in the 
descriptive analysis). In this chapter, the results of the empirical framework, as set out in 
Chapter 3, are explored. The empirical results show a relationship that can be quantified and 
more importantly, statistically tested. The results of the “surprise” regression as well as the 
event study are analysed and discussed hereunder. 
 
6.2 “Surprise” regression  
This section analyses the basic relationship through which LSAPs impact on the four SA study 
variables. The results in this section show the response (or reaction) of the four study variables 
to a one percent change in non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed.  
 
6.2.1 “Surprise” regression results 
Table 6.2 summarises the relationship between non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and 
the four study variables: We estimate the ZAR/$US, the SA 10-year government bond yield, 
the JSE ALSI, and the SA VIX study variables over the study period 1 January 2008 to 31 
December 2015 using an ordinary least squares regression, like Cook and Hahn (1989). The 
changes in four of the five variables are recorded as the percentage difference – the change 
in the 10-year bond is recorded in basis points – between the week before and the week after 
an FOMC announcement, for each FOMC announcement date as defined in chapter 4. 
 
Table 6.2. Response of SA study variables to changes in non-borrowed reserves held at the 
Fed 
 
ZAR/US$SA ten - year bondJSE ALSI SA VIX
Coefficient -0.16 -9.00 0.17 -0.25
Std. Error 0.08 -5.00 0.09 0.19
t-statistic -2.00 -1.80 1.90 -1.32
p-value 0.05** 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.18
Note: The reserve balance held by the Fed is expressed in percentage change. 
The SA ten year bond is expressed in basis points. 
* ** *** Indicates significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level
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Source: Author’s own data 
The estimated responses of the ZAR/$US, SA 10-year government bond yield, the JSE ALSI, 
and the SA VIX are -0.16 percent, -9 basis points, 0.17 percent, and -0.25 percent, 
respectively. Interpreting the results, a 1 percent change in non-borrowed reserves held by 
the Fed causes a 0.16 percent appreciation of the ZAR/$US (negative sign implies ZAR 
appreciation and vice versa), a 9-basis point decrease in the SA 10-year government bond 
yield, a 0.17 percent increase in the JSE ALSI, and a -0.25 percent decrease in the SA VIX.  
 
The signs of the four coefficients of the four study variables are theoretically rational, further 
supporting the priori. We expected the ZAR/$US to appreciate, the SA 10-year government 
bond yield to fall as excess liquidity was driven into high yielding assets in SA-through the 
search for yield, and the JSE ALSI to increase in price as risk taking increased, and the SA 
VIX to fall through increasing risk appetite.  
 
The SA VIX showed the largest, albeit insignificant, response across all four variables. As US 
liquidity conditions improved through the Fed’s QE operations, and found their way into EM 
asset markets, implied market volatility declined, lowering perceptions of market risk. This 
rational applied alongside the variable that registered the second largest response, the JSE 
ALSI. It is likely to expect the SA 10-year government bond yield to show a larger response, 
as the difference between yields across countries is mostly driven by long-term bond yields. If 
portfolio rebalancing, through the search for yield, is to target higher yielding assets, like SA 
bonds, then we would expect a larger impact to bond yields. However, if volatility measures 
are falling, and risk appetite is increasing, we can assume that the search for yield is also 
being channelled into more risky assets as opposed to only risk-free high yielding assets. This 
would explain the larger impact to the JSE ALSI variable. 
 
Testing the statistical significance of each coefficient shows the p-value of the ZAR/$US, the 
SA 10-year government bond yield and the JSE ALSI, statistically significant and different from 
zero at the 10 percent significance level. The SA VIX was not statistically significant, despite 
the correct expected sign of the coefficient. 
 
In conclusion, the “surprise” regression enabled us to establish a “response” of the four study 
variables to changes in the non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed and furthermore, it 
strengthened the established priori from Chapter 5, which prompted the estimation of the event 
study. It is now known that changes to non-borrowed reserves held by the Fed, a function of 
LSAPs, had a statistically significant impact on three of the four SA variables. Clearly then, 
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the importance of using event study to further test for abnormal impacts on the four SA study 
variables, has increased. Even though the SA VIX coefficient was statistically insignificant, it 
was still included in the event study. The lack of statistical significance of the SA VIX variable 
in the “surprise” regression is likely the result of estimating with weekly data, which may have 
excluded observable effects under a higher frequency estimation. In the event study, higher 
frequency data was used which improved the power gain of the observable impact between 
the variables.  
 
6.3 Event study results 
Following the “surprise” regression results above, the event study provided further empirical 
analysis between the Fed’s LSAPs and normalisation of the MP and the four SA study 
variables. We analysed the evidence found throughout the AR and CARs over the 57 FOMC 
event announcements. We previously stated that ARs of the four SA study variables were the 
returns excess of the normal return. ARs were earned during the event window period and 
CARs were the accumulation of the ARs over each respective event window. We then posed 
the following question: if CARs among the four study variables are evident, are the CARs 
statistically significant and different from zero? 
 
The event study analysis answers the above question (as shown in Chapter 3), which helped 
to confirm the presence of abnormal and cumulative returns of the four SA study variables. 
The abnormal and cumulative returns within the entire sample period were studied, where 
ARs were calculated (as in 3.4.1 in Chapter 3) by taking the actual return less the normal 
return in the event window, and the CAR calculated (as in 3.4.3 in Chapter 3) as an aggregate 
of the ARs within the event window period. The three main findings from the event study are 
discussed hereunder. 
 
6.3.1 Abnormal returns 
Firstly, the ARs for each of the four SA study variables were plotted across the 57 FOMC 
announcement events. Analysing each study variable revealed that ARs were scattered to 
both the up- and down-side before, on, and after an FOMC announcement. Market participants 
frequently revise their expectations both up and downwards before and after an event takes 
place to incorporate new information relating to FOMC announcements (see figures A1-A4 in 
the appendix). Revision in expectations occurred during the entire five-day event window 
period. Several events showed higher spikes than others, which may imply that market 
participants formed largely incorrect expectations leading to large market corrections, or, were 
significantly surprised by the FOMC announcement event. Large corrections before and after 
FOMC event announcements also lead to large gains or losses on these financial assets and 
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their value thereof. These spikes over a short time horizon, may imply increasing volatility in 
the value of these assets, with volatility likely to bring increased uncertainty to the holders of 
these assets. 
 
Thus, it is unlikely that market participants (with respect to the four SA study variables) can 
predict the actions of the Fed during FOMC announcements pertaining to LSAPs and 
normalisation of MP. Since large ARs exist both before and after the event takes place, market 
participants are surprised by the event and constantly revised their expectations in accordance 
to what they believe will transpire in terms of current and future MP. Since LSAPs are an 
unconventional MP, which are implemented during a global recession and heightened global 
uncertainty, it may be acceptable that market participants are not able to predict the Fed’s MP 
actions at each FOMC announcement event despite the Fed communicating more clearly the 
path of future unconventional MPs and issuing forward guidance for most of the FOMC 
announcements as the asset purchase program matures.  
 
6.3.2 Cumulative ARs 
Secondly, the CARs of each study variable seemed to be event-specific and were mostly 
random in nature. Any abnormality arising from consecutive FOMC announcements were 
unrelated to each other across all four study variables. Specific events had a greater impact 
than others at the cumulative level.  
 
Figure 6.3 Cumulative ARs for the four SA study variables 
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Source: Author’s own data 
 
The largest CAR movements differed between each SA study variable, with the largest 
positive and negative ZAR/$US CAR around event one and event 23. For the SA 10-year 
government bond yield, the largest positive and negative CAR movement was evident during 
event one and event 30. The JSE ALSI’s largest CAR positive and negative movements were 
during event two and event 22. Lastly, for the SA VIX, the largest positive and negative CAR 
movements were events 42 and 29. The largest CAR positive movements for three of the four 
study variables centred around the Fed’s first two FOMC announcements, whilst for the VIX, 
the largest CAR move occurred uniquely during the latter part of the Fed’s LSAPs, 
respectively, event 42. For negative CAR movements, all four study variables’ largest 
movements were during the event periods 22 and 30, suggesting that this period of FOMC 
announcement events was highly negative for the four SA study variables.  
 
6.3.3 Event study statistics 
The rolling window correlation analysis for each SA study variable (end of Chapter 3) 
suggested a unique set of events that corresponded with a threshold correlation coefficient, 
implying that each SA study variable co-moved with non-borrowed reserves held at the Fed 
on specific FOMC announcements. We also stated that correlation does not imply causation 
and that the unique events that were singled out would be tested later for statistical 
significance when conducting the event study methodology.  
 
Following the correlation analysis, and looking at the ZAR/$US variable, 10 of the 15 events 
proved to be strongly correlated in the Chapter 5 study, and were significant in nature, with 
just five events registering insignificant. A similar outcome was noted for the SA VIX variable, 
despite having the least number of correlating events with non-borrowed reserves among all 
four variables.  
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However, for the SA 10-year government bond yield and the JSE ALSI variables, it was a 
mixed result for correlating events and statistically significant outcomes according to the event 
study. For the SA 10-year government bond yield, just six of the suggested 14 events were 
significant, and for the JSE ALSI, seven out of 13 events were found to be significant. Clearly, 
the correlation analysis provided a better analysis for the ZAR/$US and for the SA VIX 
variables when looking forward at the event study results, while the outcomes for the 
remaining two variables were largely unexplained by the correlation study. 
 
Even so, this demonstrates that the correlation analysis provided relative support to the priori 
in this thesis, and although the study does not imply causality, across two of the four study 
variables, there was on average, significant evidence to suggest otherwise.  
 
Notwithstanding, the third main outcome as illustrated hereunder in Table 6.3. shows that each 
study variable had, on average, more than 30 significant events that impacted abnormally on 
the CARs, with the SA VIX having the most number of significant impacts, while the SA 10-
year government bond yield fell shy by just two significant events. The large number of 
individual impacts may be attributed to the fact that during this period of the Fed’s 
unconventional MP, each study variable was, on average, abnormally impacted. This further 
suggests that market participants, on average, are surprised, or slow to adapt to each outcome 
of the Fed’s unconventional MP, considering the number of times each individual study 
variable is significantly impacted.  
 
Table 6.3 Number of significant events across each and all four study variables 
 
Source: Author’s own  
On the other hand, grouping the number of significant events by impact on four, three, two, 
and one SA study variable, suggests an alternate impact to the CARs. Thirteen significant 
events impacted on four variable’s CARs simultaneously, whilst 18 significant events impacted 
on three and two variable’s CARs simultaneously, leaving eight significant events to impact 
on only one variable’s CAR. Nonetheless, 31 significant events impacted on between three 
and four variable’s CARs while 44 events impacted significantly on at least three study 
variables. Therefore, the Fed’s 57 FOMC announcements pertaining to LSAPs and 
ZAR/US$ SA ten year bond yield JSE ALSI SA VIX
Significant events on single variables 34 28 33 37
Four variables Three variables Two variables One variable
Significant events (all variables interact) 13 18 18 8
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normalisation of MP, except for some events, appear to have had a cumulative significant 
impact on the four SA study variables. 
Moreover, looking at tables A5-A11 in the appendix, which details the statistical testing of the 
ARs and CARs of the event study, it is evident that the null hypothesis (that both the abnormal 
and cumulative abnormal impacts of a FOMC announcement pertaining to LSAPs and 
normalisation of MP by the Fed, calculated in the event windows, were not significant for the 
57 FOMC announcements) was rejected at the five percent significance level. This leads to 
the finding that there was an abnormal and cumulative impact on the four SA study variables 
resulting from the Fed’s FOMC announcements pertaining to LSAPs and normalisation of MP.  
Summarising the results of the event study, it is evident that markets are largely unsuccessful 
in predicting the path of the Fed’s unconventional MP, where one can see significant over- 
and under-reactions both before and following an FOMC announcement in the ARs of each 
study variable. Furthermore, there was considerable evidence that the Fed’s FOMC 
announcements pertaining to LSAPs and normalisation of the MP had a significant cumulative 
abnormal impact on the four SA study variables, whereby the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
impact is rejected, albeit even with some events where no significant impact was observed 
across at least two variables (or on a single variable with no interaction). 
The results of the above event study are consistent with several academic studies that have 
affirmed a similar impact, although only for LSAPs and not for the normalisation of US MP on 
financial market variables. Studies like Bouraoui (2015), demonstrate that the tapering of 
LSAPs reveals negative abnormal impacts on EM currencies and other assets. Bowman et al. 
(2015) is another study that illustrates the shock of the Fed’s unconventional MPs on EMs 
asset prices and exchange rates, concluding their abnormal impact thereof.  
6.4 Conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter was to establish the response of the four SA study variables, 
before, on, and after the Fed’s FOMC announcements pertaining to unconventional easing 
and interest rate normalisation. The event study methodology allowed us to achieve this 
objective, since it assesses the significance of financial market surprises on dates of FOMC 
announcements relating to both LSAPs and the normalisation of MP. Here, the daily change 
to the four SA study variables were used to calculate the surprise component of FOMC policy 
announcements, to determine whether FOMC announcements methodically surprise the four 
SA study variables.  
 
The event study methodology results reveal that on many announcements, the Fed’s 
unconventional MP is largely unanticipated with respect to the four SA study variables. 
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Additionally, the impact of the Fed’s unconventional MP and normalisation announcements is 
not significantly incorporated into the price of domestic financial market variables, and 
therefore, the null hypothesis that FOMC announcements have no impact on the four SA study 
variables is widely rejected. This suggests that over the study period, the Fed’s unconventional 
MP and the start of normalising interest rates, did, on average, abnormally and significantly 
impact the market value of the four SA financial market variables. 
 
Essentially, the results of this chapter suggest that the Fed’s unconventional MP in the form 
of LSAPs and the more recent normalisation of interest rates, created disturbances to SA 
financial market variables through spill-over effects resulting from the Fed wanting to restore 
liquidity, encourage aggregate expenditure, and check undesirable inflationary pressures 
within the US economy. The Fed’s LSAPs entailed purchasing large sums of MBSs, GSEs, 
agency debt, and long-dated USTs to influence and restore liquidity in US financial markets, 
following the GFC.  
Even with the Fed releasing statements regarding the size of each LSAP and forward 
guidance pertaining to the level of the Fed funds rate and continued asset purchases, SA 
financial market variables have been abnormally impacted on many occasions. Over the entire 
period of LSAPs and the more recent normalisation of the Fed funds rate, the four SA study 
variables were largely surprised, even on FOMC meeting dates where there was no change 
to policy.  
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Chapter 7: Recommendations for future research 
 
Considering the methodologies used in this study, and the empirical results discussed in 
Chapter 6, this chapter outlines recommendations for future research about LSAPs and the 
Fed’s normalisation announcements on four key SA financial market variables.  
Firstly, this study focussed on announcements strictly pertaining to LSAPs and the Fed’s 
normalisation of interest rates, and hence, did not consider measuring the impact of the Fed’s 
forward guidance, explicitly. Quantifying the impact and effectiveness of the Fed’s forward 
guidance separately to that of LSAPs and normalisation announcements would aid in better 
understanding abnormality in the four SA study variables over the study period. Moreover, 
forward guidance plays a pivotal role in monetary policy setting, forming an important aspect 
for future expectations of economic agents, giving additional weight to further research.  
Secondly, in terms of research limitations, using higher frequency data (hourly, minute, 
second) may improve the accuracy of assessing abnormality in asset price returns. Although 
this study used daily data due to availability constraints, an event’s impact on financial market 
variables diminishes the longer it is public knowledge, decreasing the market impact. 
Additionally, other financial market events in both the US and SA may occur on the same day 
as the Fed LSAP and normalisation announcements, potentially exacerbating or diminishing 
the announcement impact resulting from the Fed.  
Thirdly, most of this study focuses on the Fed’s LSAP announcements, while a mere single 
interest rate hike of the Fed funds rate was considered in terms of its impact on the four SA 
study variables. Since the first interest rate hike at the end of 2015, the Fed has announced 
six more increases in the Fed funds rate, which were not included in this study, but are worth 
further exploration in terms of assessing their impact on the four SA study variables. 
Lastly, while the 30-day estimation period of the event study methodology may have sufficed 
in meeting the minimum criteria, as suggested by the central limit theorem and satisfying 
normality assumptions, the use of a non-parametric event study estimation would serve as an 
appropriate alternative to the parametric method used in this study. This is because non-
parametric estimation allows the functional form of a fit to data to be obtained in the absence 
of any guidance or theoretical constraints. Where events might overlap in periods of less than 
30 days, the application of non-parametric estimation becomes beneficial to the researcher.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
This minor dissertation set out to establish the pertinent effects of the Fed’s LSAP programme 
and interest rate normalisation, where the Fed undertook LSAPs in the wake of the GFC to 
stimulate falling aggregate demand and check undesirable inflationary pressures in the US 
economy. This was induced by consumers defaulting on their mortgage bonds resulting in 
large amounts of MBS’ values collapsing and drying up liquidity in asset markets across the 
US – and their spill-over effects to SA financial market variables. The unconventional MP 
decisions by the Fed created excess liquidity in global financial markets, which were 
channelled into EMs, like SA, as investors purchased EM financial assets, seeking higher 
yielding returns than in AEs. These portfolio flows, through global transmission channels, 
revealed market demand and supply pressures on local asset prices. 
With respect to this argument, the main aim of this minor-dissertation was to investigate 
whether or not the Fed’s LSAPs, commonly known as QE, had exhibited an abnormal impact 
on the SA financial market since the Fed implemented LSAPs towards the end of 2008 and 
subsequently ended them in the latter part of 2014, and the start of normalisation of the Fed 
funds rate towards the latter part of 2015. More specifically, four key SA financial market 
variables were studied to assess if any abnormal effects prevailed, namely: the exchange rate 
(ZAR/$US), the SA 10-year government bond yield, the JSE ALSI, and the SA VIX. Simply, 
there was strictly one objective of this minor dissertation, but, this objective was met by two 
broader findings: firstly, arising from the main objective’s results, we evaluated the short-term 
predictability of the Fed’s unconventional MP decisions by analysing the SA financial market 
variables’ reactions to predict future unconventional MP actions by the Fed, using the event 
study methodology. Secondly, again through event study, the explicit objective was to 
determine whether the Fed’s LSAPs and normalisation of MP exhibited, through FOMC 
announcements, any abnormal impacts on the value of the four SA study variables and their 
returns. To establish the above statements, a methodical approach was developed through 
the process of a quantitative research model–event study, which involved an empirical study 
of the impact of the Fed’s LSAPs and normalisation of MP using both statistical and 
econometric techniques. 
To accomplish the main objective, and the two outcomes that arose therefrom, the event study 
methodology was used to analyse the SA financial market’s ability to anticipate and predict 
the Fed's future MP decisions This was achieved by assessing each FOMC announcement 
date and the market’s ability to incorporate MP decisions into each one of the four SA study 
variables market value before and immediately after an event. On average, it was found that 
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market participants were largely and consistently unable to predict the Fed’s MP actions over 
the study period.  
Secondly, the event study was again used to assess whether any abnormal impacts on the 
four SA study variables arose out of the result of the Fed’s LSAP program and more recently, 
the normalising of the Fed funds rate, during FOMC announcements. The event study 
evaluated the magnitude of both ARs and CARs of the exchange rate (ZAR/$US), the SA 10-
year government bond yield, the JSE ALSI, and the SA VIX, over each FOMC announcement 
date. 
The results of the event study analysis, with some exceptions, showed on average, that the 
Fed’s LSAPs and normalisation had a significant abnormal and cumulative abnormal impact 
on the market value of the four SA study variables over the study period. The event study 
results affirmed the previous finding where market participants holding one or all four SA study 
variables were inconsistent or had a high degree of inaccuracy, in predicting the Fed’s current 
and future MP over the study period. Hence, if predictability is weak or non-existent, then one 
would expect there to be relatively large price swings both to the up- and down-side in the 
value of the study variables.  
Both findings of the empirical analysis show that financial market participants are unable to 
correctly predict MP decisions by the Fed on a consistent basis, and, an abnormal impact on 
the four SA study variables is evident. There are a few explanations that can explain the results 
found in Chapter 6. Firstly, on predictability, this type of unconventional MP was undertaken 
during a largely uncertain economic time, where the resultant shock of the GFC rippled across 
global markets, impacting on sentiment, asset prices, and market volatility. Even with the Fed 
communicating guidance with respect to LSAPs and normalisation, SA financial market 
variables showed large corrections in ARs before and after each FOMC announcement. In 
addition, with the implementation of this type of unconventional policy, it was mostly unknown 
whether the intended effects would prevail, and if so, what the impact would be on the US 
economy, and more broadly, the global economy. Since Japan recorded mixed results on the 
economic outcomes of its QEP, the Fed was mostly guided by a theoretical outcome at the 
time of implementation. Secondly, the Fed’s continuous LSAPs drove excess liquidity into US 
and global financial markets, which in turn found its way into EM assets, like those of the four 
SA study variables. This was particularly evident during FOMC announcements in which 
LSAPs and normalisation of MP were mentioned, and given their expected impact on asset 
prices, should they increase or decrease. 
In conclusion, the results of the analysis in this minor-dissertation support the notion that on 
average, market participants were largely unable to predict the Fed’s unconventional MP. This 
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lead to an abnormal impact on SA financial market variables arising from the undertaking of 
LSAPs and the Fed’s more recent normalisation of MP. 
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A4. ARs of the SA VIX 
 
A5-A11. Event study results 
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Event Date
AR CAR J1-p valueJ2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value
t₀-3 -2.05 -2.05 -1.26 -1.26 4.69 4.69 -3.22 -3.22
t₀-2 1.18 -0.87 -1.48 -2.74 -0.7 3.99 1.5 -1.72
t₀-1 0.36 -0.51 -2.51 -5.26 -1.7 2.29 0.26 -1.45
12/16/2008 t₀ -1.36 -1.87 -0.64 -5.9 0.13 2.42 0.01 -1.44
t₀+1 -2.56 -4.43 0,00* 0,00* -2.59 -8.49 0,00* 0,00* 2.22 4.64 0,00* 0,00* 0.64 -0.8 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 1.20 1.20 0.02 0.02 -1.02 -1.02 3.57 3.57
t₀-2 -1.57 -0.37 1.49 1.51 3.37 2.36 -6.53 -2.95
t₀-1 -1.11 -1.35 0.29 1.80 2.86 5.22 -2.77 -5.72
1/28/2009 t₀ -1.11 -2.47 -1.87 -0.07 2.33 7.55 -3.54 -9.27
t₀+1 0.87 -1.59 0,10** 0,09** -1.92 -1.98 0,09*** 0,08*** -1.67 5.89 0,00* 0,00* -0.50 -9.76 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 0.70 0.70 -1.12 -1.12 3.31 3.31 -5.61 -5.61
t₀-2 -0.32 0.37 -0.59 -1.71 0.10 3.41 -0.61 -6.22
t₀-1 -2.24 -0.66 1.66 -0.04 -1.32 2.09 2.62 -3.60
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t₀+1 -0.10 -3.00 0,04** 0,03** -0.45 -1.80 0,10*** 0,09*** 5.86 7.85 0,00* 0,00* -3.12 -6.31 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -2.16 -2.16 -0.15 -0.15 1.75 1.75 -3.92 -3.92
t₀-2 1.19 -0.97 0.03 -0.11 0.03 1.78 0.32 -3.60
t₀-1 -1.45 -2.38 -1.22 -1.34 -1.89 -0.12 4.84 1.24
4/29/2009 t₀ -1.45 -3.82 1.42 0.09 1.01 0.90 0.32 1.56
t₀+1 0.69 -3.13 0,04** 0,03** 2.05 2.13 0,08*** 0,07*** 0.83 1.73 0,10*** 0,10*** -3.48 -1.92 0,09*** 0,08***
t₀-3 -0.63 -0.63 0.48 0.48 0.93 0.93 0.20 0.20
t₀-2 1.58 0.95 0.28 0.76 -2.18 -1.25 1.30 1.50
t₀-1 -1.53 0.90 0.69 1.45 -0.59 -1.85 1.15 2.65
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t₀+1 -0.31 -0.95 0.46 0.44 1.03 2.07 0,08*** 0,07*** -1.20 -0.70 0.66 0.65 0.07 3.22 0,04** 0,03**
t₀-3 -1.05 -1.05 0.06 0.06 -0.38 -0.38 -0.44 -0.44
t₀-2 1.32 0.27 0.06 0.11 -0.49 -0.87 0.75 0.31
t₀-1 -0.63 0.35 1.01 1.12 -2.05 -2.92 3.64 3.95
8/12/2009 t₀ -0.63 -0.28 -1.66 -0.53 -0.86 -3.78 0.71 4.66
t₀+1 -0.97 -1.25 0,10*** 0,10*** 0.35 -0.19 0.74 0.72 1.21 -2.57 0,06*** 0,05** -4.73 -0.07 0.88 0.82
t₀-3 0.83 0.83 0.58 0.58 -0.64 -0.64 -1.01 -1.01
t₀-2 1.00 1.83 0.13 0.71 -1.91 -2.55 3.42 2.41
t₀-1 1.22 0.86 0.40 1.11 0.31 -2.24 -4.06 -1.66
9/23/2009 t₀ 1.22 2.08 1.51 2.62 -0.51 -2.75 0.12 -1.54
t₀+1 0.73 2.81 0,05** 0,05** 0.20 2.82 0,05*** 0,05*** -0.14 -2.89 0,05** 0,05** 0.07 -1.47 0,10*** 0,10***
t₀-3 0.85 0.85 -1.17 -1.17 -0.90 -0.90 3.13 3.13
t₀-2 1.77 2.62 0.60 -0.57 -1.13 -2.02 7.00 10.13
t₀-1 -2.91 0.87 -0.29 -0.86 -1.56 -3.58 4.33 14.46
11/4/2009 t₀ -2.91 -2.04 -1.21 -2.07 0.47 -3.11 -0.60 13.86
t₀+1 -0.58 -2.62 0,05** 0,05** -0.13 -2.20 0,06** 0,05** -0.29 -3.40 0,04** 0,03** -0.03 13.83 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -0.30 -0.30 0.14 0.14 0.62 0.62 -2.12 -2.12
t₀-2 -1.62 -1.92 -0.08 0.06 0.33 0.95 -1.91 -4.03
t₀-1 -0.02 -1.39 -0.03 0.03 -0.68 0.27 2.20 -1.84
12/16/2009 t₀ -0.02 -1.42 -0.14 -0.11 -0.15 0.12 0.14 -1.69
t₀+1 1.48 0.06 0.90 0.89 0.35 0.24 0.80 0.79 -0.04 0.09 0.85 0.84 -1.51 -3.21 0,04*** 0,03***
Note:*,** and *** indicates test statistic significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level 
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Event Date
AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p valueJ2-p value
t₀-3 0.41 0.41 0.06 0.06 -1.62 -1.62 5.13 5.13
t₀-2 -1.08 -0.68 0.02 0.08 0.01 -1.61 -0.19 4.93
t₀-1 0.26 -0.41 -0.33 -0.25 -1.65 -3.25 5.27 10.20
1/27/2010 t₀ 0.18 -0.23 -0.69 -0.94 0.51 -2.74 0.11 10.31
t₀+1 -0.01 -0.24 0.55 0.53 -0.54 -1.48 0,07*** 0,06*** -0.08 -2.82 0,05** 0,04** -0.18 10.13 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 0.04 0.04 0.20 0.20 -0.80 -0.80 0.70 0.70
t₀-2 -0.22 -0.17 -0.61 -0.41 1.08 0.28 -0.98 -0.28
t₀-1 0.07 -0.10 0.23 -0.18 -0.98 -0.70 -0.10 -0.38
3/16/2010 t₀ -0.45 -0.55 -0.10 -0.28 0.61 -0.09 1.91 1.54
t₀+1 -0.78 -1.34 0,10*** 0,10*** -0.29 -0.57 0.38 0.37 0.81 0.72 0.34 0.33 -3.69 -2.15 0,06*** 0,05**
t₀-3 -0.74 -0.74 -0.38 -0.38 0.38 0.38 1.28 1.28
t₀-2 -1.11 -1.84 0.09 -0.30 1.30 1.67 -3.72 -2.44
t₀-1 1.81 -0.03 0.19 -0.10 0.00 1.67 -0.02 -2.46
4/28/2010 t₀ -0.94 -0.97 2.09 1.99 -2.72 -1.05 19.43 16.97
t₀+1 -0.72 -1.68 0,10*** 0,10*** -0.43 1.56 0,07*** 0,06*** 0.67 -0.38 0.50 0.49 -8.54 8.43 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -1.33 -1.33 -0.58 -0.58 -0.10 -0.10 2.97 2.97
t₀-2 0.36 -0.97 0.03 -0.54 0.99 0.89 3.62 6.59
t₀-1 0.83 -0.14 0.33 -0.21 -0.36 0.53 0.93 7.52
6/23/2010 t₀ -0.65 -0.79 0.19 -0.02 -1.04 -0.51 2.77 10.29
t₀+1 1.02 0.23 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.38 0.37 -0.71 -1.22 0,07*** 0,06*** 0.80 11.09 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -0.04 -0.04 0.60 0.60 -0.38 -0.38 0.92 0.92
t₀-2 -0.09 -0.13 -0.26 0.35 -1.20 -1.58 2.84 3.77
t₀-1 -0.31 -0.44 0.23 0.58 -0.33 -1.91 0.84 4.61
8/10/2010 t₀ 0.59 0.15 0.27 0.85 -1.63 -3.54 2.92 7.53
t₀+1 1.51 1.66 0,08*** 0,07*** -1.21 -0.36 0.50 0.49 -1.98 -5.52 0,00* 0,00* 3.83 11.35 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 0.81 0.81 1.86 1.86 -0.28 -0.28 -3.64 -3.64
t₀-2 -0.04 0.77 1.94 3.80 -0.33 -0.61 1.17 -2.47
t₀-1 0.05 0.82 0.12 3.92 0.89 0.28 -1.89 -4.37
9/21/2010 t₀ -1.05 -0.23 -0.64 3.28 -0.10 0.18 3.68 -0.69
t₀+1 -0.04 -0.27 0.54 0.53 -1.16 2.13 0,06*** 0,05** -0.16 0.03 0.99 0.98 0.22 -0.47 0.38 0.37
t₀-3 -0.10 -0.10 -0.25 -0.25 0.61 0.61 -1.10 -1.10
t₀-2 -0.32 -0.42 -0.04 -0.30 0.48 1.08 -0.90 -2.00
t₀-1 -1.09 -1.51 -0.55 -0.84 -0.29 0.79 0.35 -1.66
11/3/2010 t₀ -0.41 -1.92 -0.60 -1.44 0.48 1.27 -0.82 -2.48
t₀+1 -0.88 -2.80 0,04** 0,03** -1.10 -2.54 0,05** 0,04** 1.44 2.71 0,03* 0,02* -3.10 -5.58 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -0.69 -0.69 -0.71 -0.71 -0.60 -0.60 -0.17 -0.17
t₀-2 -0.16 -0.85 -1.35 -2.06 -0.53 -1.13 1.84 1.67
t₀-1 -0.43 -1.28 0.19 -1.87 0.12 -1.01 -2.44 -0.76
12/14/2010 t₀ -0.03 -1.31 -0.46 -2.33 0.20 -0.81 -0.25 -1.02
t₀+1 0.34 -0.97 0.25 0.26 0.21 -2.12 0,06*** 0,05** -0.01 -0.82 0.28 0.27 -0.13 -1.14 0.13 0.12
Note:*,** and *** indicates test statistic significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level 
ZAR/US$ SA 10 - year bond yield JSE ALSI SA VIX
Event Date
AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p valueJ2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value
t₀-3 -0.49 -0.49 1.87 1.87 0.93 0.93 -0.86 -0.86
t₀-2 -0.92 -1.41 -1.33 0.54 -0.86 0.07 4.38 3.52
t₀-1 0.67 -0.73 -0.88 -0.34 -0.69 -0.62 2.02 5.53
1/26/2011 t₀ 0.01 -0.72 -0.36 -0.70 0.95 0.33 -1.19 4.34
t₀+1 -0.25 -0.97 0.25 0.26 -0.08 -0.78 0.47 0.46 0.52 0.86 0.40 0.39 -0.91 3.43 0,04** 0,03**
t₀-3 1.07 1.07 0.06 0.06 -2.86 -2.86 5.20 5.20
t₀-2 -0.47 0.61 -0.27 -0.21 0.97 -1.89 -2.08 3.11
t₀-1 -0.73 -0.12 -0.78 -0.99 -0.87 -2.76 5.23 8.34
3/15/2011 t₀ 2.31 2.19 -0.60 -1.60 -2.16 -4.91 7.30 15.64
t₀+1 1.96 4.15 0,00* 0,00* 0.10 -1.49 0,07*** 0,06*** 1.46 -3.46 0,04** 0,03** -1.73 13.91 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.05 -0.24 -0.24 0.95 0.95
t₀-2 0.47 0.72 0.12 0.17 -0.24 -0.49 0.95 1.89
t₀-1 -0.68 0.05 0.53 0.70 -0.22 -0.71 0.90 2.79
4/27/2011 t₀ -0.99 -0.95 -0.08 0.62 -0.24 -0.95 0.95 3.74
t₀+1 0.28 -0.66 0.40 0.39 0.06 0.69 0.50 0.49 -0.27 -1.22 0,09*** 0,08*** 0.95 4.69 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -1.23 -1.23 -0.26 -0.26 -0.99 -0.99 2.80 2.80
t₀-2 0.44 -0.78 0.20 -0.06 -0.05 -1.04 -0.46 2.35
t₀-1 -1.06 -1.84 -0.73 -0.79 1.20 0.17 -2.31 0.04
6/22/2011 t₀ 1.07 -0.77 0.14 -0.65 -0.49 -0.32 0.57 0.62
t₀+1 0.74 -0.02 0.95 0.94 0.36 -0.29 0.80 0.79 -1.44 -1.76 0,07*** 0,06*** 1.74 2.36 0,05** 0,05**
t₀-3 3.22 3.22 -0.86 -0.86 -2.90 -2.90 4.25 4.25
t₀-2 -0.14 3.08 1.24 0.39 -1.02 -3.92 1.91 6.16
t₀-1 3.99 7.07 0.80 1.18 -2.85 -6.77 6.48 12.64
8/9/2011 t₀ -1.15 5.92 0.19 1.37 0.15 -6.61 -0.16 12.48
t₀+1 2.09 8.01 0,00* 0,00* -1.48 -0.11 0.85 0.84 1.09 -5.52 0,00* 0,00* 4.88 17.37 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 1.19 1.19 -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03 -1.85 -1.85
t₀-2 2.09 3.27 2.46 2.40 -0.50 -0.52 -0.53 -2.38
t₀-1 0.93 4.21 -1.08 1.31 1.03 0.51 -2.84 -5.22
9/21/2011 t₀ 6.34 10.55 0.51 1.82 -0.30 0.21 -5.83 -11.06
t₀+1 2.51 13.05 0,00* 0,00* 1.96 3.78 0,04** 0,03** -3.41 -3.20 0,04** 0,03** 5.34 -5.72 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 0.42 0.42 0.01 0.01 1.08 1.08 -6.14 -6.14
t₀-2 3.35 3.77 0.80 0.81 -1.94 -0.86 3.67 -2.47
t₀-1 2.13 5.90 1.65 2.45 -2.22 -3.08 7.12 4.65
11/2/2011 t₀ -1.03 4.87 -0.73 1.72 1.21 -1.88 -4.81 -0.16
t₀+1 -1.13 3.74 0,04** 0,03** -0.24 1.48 0,05** 0,04** -0.22 -2.10 0,05** 0,04** 0.43 0.27 0.80 0.79
t₀-3 3.21 3.21 0.73 0.73 -0.07 -0.07 1.11 1.11
t₀-2 -2.11 1.09 0.89 1.62 -0.46 -0.53 0.13 1.24
t₀-1 2.16 3.25 0.64 2.26 -1.19 -1.72 2.97 4.21
12/13/2011 t₀ 1.06 4.32 1.44 3.69 -0.26 -1.98 1.11 5.32
t₀+1 0.77 5.09 0,00* 0,00* -0.58 3.11 0,04** 0,03** -1.57 -3.55 0,04** 0,03** 2.79 8.11 0,00* 0,00*
Note:*,** and *** indicates test statistic significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level 
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Event Date
AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value
t₀-3 0.46 0.46 -0.40 -0.40 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
t₀-2 0.00 0.47 -0.29 -0.69 0.51 0.66 -0.91 -0.75
t₀-1 0.28 0.75 -0.05 -0.74 -0.80 -0.14 2.09 1.34
1/25/2012 t₀ -0.35 0.40 1.08 0.34 -0.48 -0.62 0.59 1.93
t₀+1 -1.01 -0.61 0.38 0.37 -1.68 -1.33 0.11 0,1*** 1.07 0.45 0.51 0.50 -3.32 -1.38 0,10*** 0,10***
t₀-3 -1.47 -1.47 -0.17 -0.17 0.56 0.56 -1.34 -1.34
t₀-2 1.21 -0.26 0.16 0.00 0.56 1.12 -0.25 -1.59
t₀-1 -0.26 -0.52 0.29 0.29 -0.01 1.11 -0.25 -1.85
2/13/2012 t₀ -0.20 -0.72 -0.21 0.08 0.87 1.98 -1.84 -3.69
t₀+1 2.33 1.61 0,07*** 0,06*** -0.53 -0.45 0.51 0.50 0.80 2.78 0,05** 0,05** -1.28 -4.97 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -0.65 -0.65 -0.28 -0.28 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.38
t₀-2 0.30 -0.34 -0.12 -0.40 -1.50 -1.17 2.93 3.31
t₀-1 -0.73 -1.08 -2.98 -3.37 0.36 -0.80 -1.01 2.30
4/25/2012 t₀ -0.73 -1.81 -0.55 -3.92 0.63 -0.18 -0.78 1.52
t₀+1 0.06 -1.75 0,08*** 0,07*** 0.16 -3.76 0,04** 0,03** 0.66 0.49 0.51 0.50 0.23 1.75 0,08*** 0,07***
t₀-3 -0.43 -0.43 -0.07 -0.07 0.40 0.40 -1.46 -1.46
t₀-2 -0.96 -1.39 0.10 0.03 1.41 1.81 -3.86 -5.32
t₀-1 -1.22 -2.61 0.11 0.14 0.80 2.61 -1.51 -6.83
6/20/2012 t₀ -0.20 -2.81 0.29 0.43 0.22 2.83 -1.57 -8.39
t₀+1 2.06 -0.75 0.38 0.37 0.07 0.51 0.51 0.50 -0.73 2.10 0,07*** 0,06*** -4.03 -12.42 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -0.91 -0.91 0.49 0.49 1.14 1.14 0.29 0.29
t₀-2 0.61 -0.30 1.96 2.45 0.85 1.99 -4.35 -4.07
t₀-1 0.77 0.47 1.19 3.64 -1.01 0.98 3.98 -0.09
8/1/2012 t₀ 1.16 1.63 0.44 4.08 1.39 2.37 0.29 0.20
t₀+1 0.05 1.69 0,09*** 0,06*** 0.64 4.72 0,00* 0,00* -0.08 2.29 0,05** 0,05** -2.65 -2.45 0,05** 0,05**
t₀-3 0.23 0.23 -0.35 -0.35 -0.67 -0.67 -0.12 -0.12
t₀-2 -0.12 0.10 -0.06 -0.41 -0.28 -0.95 -0.01 -0.12
t₀-1 1.85 1.95 1.57 1.16 0.76 -0.19 -1.52 -1.65
9/13/2012 t₀ -1.18 0.78 0.08 1.25 0.36 0.17 -0.01 -1.65
t₀+1 -0.40 0.37 0.51 0.5 1.90 3.14 0,04** 0,03** 1.78 1.95 0,07*** 0,06*** -4.40 -6.05 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -0.12 -0.12 -0.42 -0.42 -0.86 -0.86 1.73 1.73
t₀-2 -0.42 -0.54 0.04 -0.38 0.37 -0.48 -3.44 -1.71
t₀-1 1.24 0.70 0.12 -0.26 -0.92 -1.40 1.88 0.17
10/24/2012 t₀ 0.00 0.70 0.45 0.19 0.61 -0.78 -1.43 -1.26
t₀+1 -0.67 0.03 0.97 0.96 0.61 0.80 0.38 0.37 -0.01 -0.79 0.38 0.37 0.13 -1.13 0.12 0.11
t₀-3 -0.30 -0.30 -0.57 -0.57 -0.34 -0.34 -3.20 -3.20
t₀-2 0.14 -0.16 -0.18 -0.76 0.32 -0.01 6.72 3.53
t₀-1 -0.14 -0.30 -0.43 -1.19 0.37 0.36 -8.15 -4.62
12/12/2012 t₀ -0.09 -0.38 0.43 -0.77 0.49 0.85 0.19 -4.43
t₀+1 0.08 -0.30 0.51 0.05 -0.17 -0.94 0.25 0.26 -0.32 0.53 0.51 0.50 0.19 -4.24 0,00* 0,00*
Note:*,** and *** indicates test statistic significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level 
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Event Date
AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p valueJ2-p value AR CAR J1-p valueJ2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value
t₀-3 -1.40 -1.40 0.31 0.31 -0.30 -0.30 -3.38 -3.38
t₀-2 1.52 0.12 1.39 1.70 0.06 -0.24 -0.30 -3.68
t₀-1 -1.12 -1.00 0.00 1.70 -0.05 -0.30 -0.30 -3.98
1/30/2013 t₀ -0.16 -1.16 0.16 1.86 -0.61 -0.91 0.17 -3.80
t₀+1 -1.15 -2.31 0,06*** 0,05** -1.36 0.50 0.38 0.37 -0.08 -0.99 0.20 0.19 -1.66 -5.46 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -0.01 -0.01 -0.35 -0.35 -0.39 -0.39 1.68 1.68
t₀-2 -0.25 -0.27 -0.06 -0.40 -0.73 -1.12 1.58 3.26
t₀-1 0.69 0.42 0.32 -0.08 -0.33 -1.45 -0.10 3.16
3/20/2013 t₀ 0.80 1.22 0.89 0.81 -0.09 -1.54 -0.10 3.05
t₀+1 -0.18 1.04 0.11 0,10*** -0.01 0.80 0.47 0.46 -0.02 -1.56 0,08*** 0,08*** -0.10 2.95 0,06*** 0,05**
t₀-3 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.00 -0.17 -0.17
t₀-2 -1.09 -0.93 -0.97 -0.75 -0.03 -0.02 2.44 2.28
t₀-1 -0.20 -1.12 -0.17 -0.92 -0.63 -0.65 -0.17 2.11
5/1/2013 t₀ 0.69 -0.44 0.44 -0.48 0.12 -0.53 -0.17 1.94
t₀+1 -0.71 -1.15 0,10*** 0,10*** -1.45 -1.93 0,07*** 0,06*** 1.01 0.48 0.51 0.50 -0.17 1.77 0,08*** 0,07***
t₀-3 0.63 0.63 -2.11 -2.11 1.33 1.33 -0.93 -0.93
t₀-2 -0.05 0.58 -0.98 -3.09 0.05 1.38 -0.93 -1.86
t₀-1 -0.18 0.40 1.99 -1.10 1.72 3.11 -1.13 -2.98
6/19/2013 t₀ 1.57 1.97 -2.77 -3.87 -0.48 2.62 -0.93 -3.91
t₀+1 0.22 2.19 0,07*** 0,06** 3.82 -0.05 0.95 0.94 -3.06 -0.43 0.51 0.50 5.28 1.37 0,10*** 0,10***
t₀-3 0.74 0.74 1.11 1.11 -0.72 -0.72 0.37 0.37
t₀-2 0.45 1.19 0.58 1.69 0.67 -0.04 -0.66 -0.29
t₀-1 0.28 1.47 -0.11 1.58 0.30 0.26 -1.46 -1.75
7/31/2013 t₀ 0.98 2.45 -0.56 1.02 0.61 0.87 0.37 -1.38
t₀+1 1.18 3.64 0,04** 0,03** -0.14 0.88 0.25 0.26 1.36 2.23 0,07*** 0,06** -5.65 -7.03 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -0.45 -0.45 -0.62 -0.62 -0.53 -0.53 2.12 2.12
t₀-2 -1.26 -1.71 -1.40 -2.02 -0.21 -0.74 0.33 2.45
t₀-1 -0.12 -1.82 0.52 -1.50 0.20 -0.54 0.27 2.72
9/18/2013 t₀ -2.27 -4.09 0.33 -1.17 -1.09 -1.62 1.91 4.63
t₀+1 1.18 -2.91 0,05** 0,05** -2.85 -4.02 0,00* 0,00* 1.94 0.31 0.51 0.50 -4.44 0.18 0.82 0.81
t₀-3 0.71 0.71 1.14 1.14 0.07 0.07 -0.31 -0.31
t₀-2 0.00 0.71 1.69 2.84 0.55 0.61 0.16 -0.15
t₀-1 0.62 1.32 -0.36 2.47 0.02 0.64 0.03 -0.12
10/30/2013 t₀ 0.52 1.84 -0.19 2.28 0.30 0.94 -0.17 -0.30
t₀+1 0.99 2.84 0,05** 0,05** 1.06 3.34 0,04** 0,03** -0.28 0.66 0.39 0.38 0.29 -0.01 0.99 0.98
t₀-3 -0.96 -0.96 -0.39 -0.39 0.10 0.10 -0.94 -0.94
t₀-2 -0.12 -1.08 -0.04 -0.43 0.25 0.35 -0.94 -1.88
t₀-1 0.40 -0.68 -0.27 -0.69 1.78 2.13 -3.70 -5.58
12/18/2013 t₀ 0.11 -0.56 0.28 -0.41 0.43 2.55 -0.94 -6.52
t₀+1 0.40 -0.17 0.88 0.87 -0.57 -0.98 0.25 0.26 1.16 3.72 0,04** 0,03** -2.38 -8.89 0,00* 0,00*
Note:*,** and *** indicates test statistic significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level 
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Event Date
AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value
t₀-3 0.64 0.64 0.57 0.57 -1.49 -1.49 5.97 5.97
t₀-2 0.02 0.66 1.06 1.64 -1.78 -3.27 7.36 13.34
t₀-1 -0.90 -0.24 0.19 1.82 -0.29 -3.56 0.15 13.49
1/29/2014 t₀ 2.25 2.01 0.29 2.11 -0.59 -4.15 2.33 15.82
t₀+1 -1.18 0.82 0.25 0.26 0.32 2.43 0,07*** 0,06** -1.09 -5.24 0,00* 0,00* 2.57 18.39 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -1.18 -1.18 -0.21 -0.21 -1.05 -1.05 1.77 1.77
t₀-2 1.05 -0.12 0.49 0.28 0.71 -0.34 -0.99 0.78
t₀-1 -0.31 -0.44 0.37 0.65 0.36 0.02 -0.95 -0.17
3/19/2014 t₀ 1.36 0.93 -0.53 0.13 -1.00 -0.98 4.38 4.21
t₀+1 0.25 1.18 0,10*** 0,10*** 0.75 0.87 0.25 0.26 -0.50 -1.48 0,10*** 0,09*** 0.39 4.60 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 0.55 0.55 -0.17 -0.17 -0.25 -0.25 -2.69 -2.69
t₀-2 -0.30 0.25 -0.02 -0.19 -0.20 -0.46 0.80 -1.89
t₀-1 -0.55 -0.29 -0.09 -0.28 -0.15 -0.61 1.31 -0.58
4/30/2014 t₀ -0.23 -0.53 -0.35 -0.63 -0.34 -0.95 1.05 0.47
t₀+1 -0.24 -0.77 0.25 0.26 -0.02 -0.65 0.38 0.37 -0.20 -1.15 0,10*** 0,10*** 0.80 1.27 0,10*** 0,09***
t₀-3 -0.09 -0.09 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 1.21 1.21
t₀-2 0.58 0.49 -0.07 0.11 -0.13 0.08 1.05 2.27
t₀-1 0.66 1.15 0.56 0.66 0.16 0.24 0.97 3.24
6/18/2014 t₀ -1.76 -0.61 -0.45 0.21 -0.55 -0.31 1.05 4.29
t₀+1 0.66 0.05 0.98 0.97 -1.44 -1.22 0,10*** 0,09*** 0.99 0.68 0.38 0.37 -3.23 1.06 0.11 0,10***
t₀-3 -0.06 -0.06 0.65 0.65 -0.17 -0.17 -0.56 -0.56
t₀-2 0.58 0.52 0.41 1.06 0.70 0.54 -0.27 -0.84
t₀-1 0.44 0.96 0.22 1.28 0.58 1.11 -0.49 -1.33
7/30/2014 t₀ 0.59 1.54 0.73 2.01 -0.93 0.18 4.48 3.15
t₀+1 0.56 2.11 0,07*** 0,06** 0.45 2.45 0,07*** 0,06** -0.75 -0.58 0.38 0.37 1.29 4.44 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 0.45 0.45 0.68 0.68 -0.01 -0.01 0.20 0.20
t₀-2 -0.61 -0.16 0.16 0.84 0.21 0.20 0.13 0.32
t₀-1 -0.63 -0.80 -0.05 0.79 -0.43 -0.23 1.85 2.17
9/17/2014 t₀ 1.06 0.27 -0.63 0.16 -0.05 -0.29 3.48 5.66
t₀+1 0.38 0.65 0.39 0.38 0.20 0.36 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.40 0.62 0.61 0.13 5.79 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -0.39 -0.39 0.00 0.00 -0.19 -0.19 0.53 0.53
t₀-2 0.12 -0.27 0.57 0.57 0.63 0.44 -0.84 -0.31
t₀-1 -0.82 -1.09 -0.27 0.30 1.13 1.57 -6.48 -6.79
10/29/2014 t₀ 0.97 -0.12 0.05 0.35 1.62 3.19 -3.25 -10.05
t₀+1 -0.69 -0.81 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.52 0.38 0.37 -0.66 2.53 0,07*** 0,06** 1.79 -8.26 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 -0.48 -0.48 0.53 0.53 -0.02 -0.02 -1.86 -1.86
t₀-2 1.31 0.83 0.05 0.59 -1.23 -1.25 1.50 -0.36
t₀-1 -0.98 -0.16 -0.05 0.54 0.12 -1.13 -0.80 -1.15
12/17/2014 t₀ -0.44 -0.59 1.66 2.20 -0.12 -1.25 0.38 -0.77
t₀+1 -0.51 -1.10 0.11 0,10*** -1.61 0.59 0.38 0.37 4.28 3.03 0,04** 0,03** -7.86 -8.64 0,00* 0,00*
Note:*,** and *** indicates test statistic significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level 
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Event Date
AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value AR CAR J1-p valueJ2-p value AR CAR J1-p value J2-p value
t₀-3 0.09 0.09 -0.84 -0.84 -0.16 -0.16 0.18 0.18
t₀-2 0.57 0.66 0.71 -0.13 0.99 0.83 -5.14 -4.96
t₀-1 1.12 1.78 0.21 0.08 0.69 1.53 -3.96 -8.92
1/28/2015 t₀ 0.01 1.79 -0.77 -0.70 0.91 2.44 -2.93 -11.86
t₀+1 -0.15 1.64 0,10*** 0,09*** -0.39 -1.08 0.11 0.11 -0.55 1.89 0,09*** 0,08*** 1.62 -10.24 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 1.11 1.11 1.50 1.50 -0.89 -0.89 0.59 0.59
t₀-2 -1.01 0.10 -0.94 0.56 0.61 -0.28 0.59 1.18
t₀-1 -0.70 -0.59 -0.56 -0.01 0.27 -0.01 -0.87 0.31
3/18/2015 t₀ -2.74 -3.33 -0.48 -0.49 -0.26 -0.27 0.59 0.90
t₀+1 1.69 -1.64 0,10*** 0,09*** -1.68 -2.16 0,07*** 0,06** 1.01 0.74 0.47 0.46 0.59 1.49 0,10*** 0,09***
t₀-3 -0.16 -0.16 -0.59 -0.59 0.77 0.77 -1.83 -1.83
t₀-2 -0.92 -1.08 -0.26 -0.85 -0.14 0.62 0.11 -1.72
t₀-1 -1.12 -2.20 -1.54 -2.39 -0.42 0.21 0.46 -1.26
4/29/2015 t₀ -0.61 -2.81 0.04 -2.35 -1.05 -0.84 1.63 0.36
t₀+1 1.10 -1.71 0,10*** 0,09*** 0.04 -2.31 0,07*** 0,06** -0.33 -1.18 0,10*** 0,10*** 0.34 0.70 0.47 0.46
t₀-3 0.07 0.07 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.00 -0.13 -0.13
t₀-2 0.08 0.15 0.43 0.67 -0.93 -0.92 -0.19 -0.32
t₀-1 -0.38 -0.23 -0.06 0.61 0.10 -0.82 -0.13 -0.46
6/17/2015 t₀ -0.95 -1.18 0.37 0.98 0.68 -0.14 -3.00 -3.45
t₀+1 -0.25 -1.43 0.11 0,10*** -1.16 -0.18 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.55 0.38 0.37 -0.13 -3.59 0,03** 0,02**
t₀-3 1.66 1.66 0.65 0.65 -1.73 -1.73 0.02 0.02
t₀-2 -0.45 1.21 0.77 1.42 -0.13 -1.86 3.06 3.08
t₀-1 -0.48 0.74 0.08 1.50 -1.09 -2.95 1.75 4.83
7/29/2015 t₀ -0.29 0.44 -0.02 1.49 1.62 -1.33 -3.35 1.47
t₀+1 1.20 1.64 0,10*** 0,09*** 0.90 2.39 0,07*** 0,06** 0.31 -1.02 0.11 0.11 -3.41 -1.94 0,08*** 0,07***
t₀-3 -0.48 -0.48 0.28 0.28 0.89 0.89 0.00 0.00
t₀-2 -0.16 -0.64 -0.27 0.01 0.25 1.14 1.18 1.18
t₀-1 -1.51 -2.14 -0.22 -0.21 3.06 4.20 0.00 1.18
9/17/2015 t₀ 0.65 -1.49 0.47 0.26 1.06 5.26 0.00 1.18
t₀+1 -0.18 -1.67 0,10*** 0,09*** -1.87 -1.61 0,10*** 0,09*** -1.03 4.23 0,00* 0,00* 8.05 9.23 0,00* 0,00*
t₀-3 1.78 1.78 0.13 0.13 1.74 1.74 -9.82 -9.82
t₀-2 -0.03 1.75 -0.29 -0.16 -0.40 1.33 11.17 1.35
t₀-1 0.25 2.00 0.27 0.11 -0.84 0.50 -7.32 -5.96
10/28/2015 t₀ 0.25 2.25 -0.69 -0.58 -0.16 0.34 0.50 -5.46
t₀+1 1.32 3.57 0,03** 0,02** 1.12 0.55 0.38 0.37 -0.78 -0.45 0.41 0.40 1.59 -3.87 0,02** 0,01*
t₀-3 2.30 2.30 4.51 4.51 -1.49 -1.49 3.26 3.26
t₀-2 -5.51 -3.21 -5.16 -0.65 0.42 -1.07 -0.35 2.91
t₀-1 -1.62 -4.83 -4.55 -5.20 1.11 0.04 -0.30 2.61
12/16/2015 t₀ -0.33 -5.17 -0.64 -5.84 0.40 0.44 -0.30 2.31
t₀+1 1.47 -3.69 0,03** 0,02** -2.85 -8.69 0,00* 0,00* 3.00 3.44 0,03** 0,02** -0.30 2.01 0,07*** 0,06***
Note:*,** and *** indicates test statistic significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level 
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A12. FOMC meeting dates 
 
FOMC Dates FOMC Dates
16 December 2008 01 August 2012
28 January 2009 13 September 2012
18 March 2009 24 October 2012
29 April 2009 12 December 2012
24 June 2009 30 January 2013
12 August 2009 20 March 2013
23 September 2009 01 May 2013
04 November 2009 19 June 2013
16 December 2009 31 July 2013
27 January 2010 18 September 2013
16 March 2010 30 October 2013
28 April 2010 18 December 2013
23 June 2010 29 January 2014
10 August 2010 19 March 2014
21 September 2010 30 April 2014
03 November 2010 18 June 2014
14 December 2010 30 July 2014
26 January 2011 17 September 2014
15 March 2011 29 October 2014
27 April 2011 17 December 2014
22 June 2011 28 January 2015
09 August 2011 18 March 2015
21 September 2011 29 April 2015
02 November 2011 17 June 2015
13 December 2011 29 July 2015
25 January 2012 17 September 2015
13 March 2012 28 October 2015
25 April 2012 16 December 2015
20 June 2012
